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The Supreme Court's multiple opinions and divergent analyses in
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 11
reflect deep-seated tensions in equal protection law and the meaning of racial
equality. A plurality led by Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Kennedy,
formed the five-member majority that voted to strike down race-conscious
voluntary desegregation plans in Seattle, Washington and Louisville,
Kentucky as violations of the Equal Protection Clause. Justice Breyer, joined
by three other Justices in dissent, would have upheld the student assignment
plans as constitutional. The Court's dividing lines in Parents Involved are
extensive, revealing disagreements over the appropriate standard of review to
evaluate voluntary desegregation plans,2 the meaning and valuation of racial
diversity as a governmental interest, 3 and the fitness of racial classifications
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Support of Respondents in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007), and as Counsel of Record for the American
Educational Research Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents in
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
In each of these instances, the amicus curiae briefs highlighted scientific research
findings which supported the use of race-conscious policies to promote diversity in
education.
1 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). The Supreme Court consolidated the Parents Involved
litigation, which involved a Seattle, Washington school district, with Meredith v.
Jefferson County Board of Education, No. 05-915, which involved the school district for
the metropolitan area of Louisville, Kentucky. Id. at 2746.
2 Compare Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2752 (opinion of the Court) ("As the
Court recently reaffirmed, 'racial classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any
but the most exact connection between justification and classification."' (citations
omitted)), with id. at 2819 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The view that a more lenient standard
than 'strict scrutiny' should apply in the present context would not imply abandonment of
judicial efforts carefully to determine the need for race-conscious criteria and the
criteria's tailoring in light of the need.").
3 Compare id. at 2755 (plurality opinion) ("In design and operation, the plans are
directed only to racial balance, pure and simple, an objective this Court has repeatedly
condemned as illegitimate."), with id. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) ("A compelling interest exists in avoiding racial isolation, an
interest that a school district, in its discretion and expertise, may choose to pursue.
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in assigning students in K-12 educational settings.4 Moreover, as
demonstrated by the stark ideological contrasts between the Roberts plurality
and the other Justices in Parents Involved,5 there are profound divisions over
whether Brown v. Board of Education stands for a strict anti-classification
norm of color-blindness or for an anti-subordination ideal that permits color-
consciousness to address persistent racial inequality. 6
Along a separate set of dimensions-more methodological than
ideological-the Parents Involved opinions illuminate another group of
differences that have arisen in recent Supreme Court cases. These differences
focus on the role of scientific research findings in the development of
standards and rules under the Equal Protection Clause. In Parents Involved,
the Roberts plurality and Justice Kennedy formed the bloc that struck down
the Seattle and Louisville desegregation policies, but neither the Roberts
opinion nor the Kennedy opinion cited scientific research to support the
Court's judgment. On the other hand, Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion
relied heavily on scientific findings on the benefits of diversity and the harms
Likewise, a district may consider it a compelling interest to achieve a diverse student
population."), and id. at 2820 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing compelling interest as
"the school districts' interest in eliminating school-by-school racial isolation and
increasing the degree to which racial mixture characterizes each of the district's schools
and each individual student's public school experience").
4 Compare id. at 2760 (opinion of the Court) ("Classifying and assigning
schoolchildren according to a binary conception of race is an extreme approach in light of
our precedents and our Nation's history of using race in public schools. .. ."), with id. at
2829-30 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The upshot is that these plans' specific
features... together show that the districts' plans are 'narrowly tailored' to achieve their
'compelling' goals.").
5 Compare id. at 2767 (plurality opinion) ("It was not the inequality of the facilities
but the fact of legally separating children on the basis of race on which the Court relied to
find a constitutional violation in 1954."), with id. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) ("School districts can seek to reach Brown's objective of
equal educational opportunity.... To the extent the plurality opinion suggests the
Constitution mandates that state and local school authorities must accept the status quo of
racial isolation in schools, it is, in my view, profoundly mistaken."), and id. at 2798
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[I]t was only black schoolchildren who were so ordered;
indeed, the history books do not tell stories of white children struggling to attend black
schools. In this and other ways, The Chief Justice rewrites the history of one of this
Court's most important decisions."), and id. at 2800 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("All of those
plans represent local efforts to bring about the kind of racially integrated education that
Brown v. Board of Education, long ago promised--efforts that this Court has repeatedly
required, permitted, and encouraged local authorities to undertake.") (citation omitted).
6 See generally Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and
Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV.
1470 (2004) (contrasting color-blind and color-conscious principles in equal protection
jurisprudence); Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9 (2003) (same).
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of segregation to argue that the plans were fully constitutional. 7 Justice
Thomas's concurring opinion also drew extensively on research findings, but
countered the Breyer dissent by arguing that the scientific literature was
inconclusive and did not lend sufficient support to the school districts'
interests in promoting diversity and addressing racial isolation.8
The stances of the Roberts, Kennedy, and Thomas opinions in Parents
Involved diverge from the approach adopted four years earlier in Grutter v.
Bollinger,9 where the Court upheld the constitutionality of race-conscious
admissions policies designed to promote student body diversity in higher
education. In addressing the question of whether promoting educational
diversity could be a compelling interest, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion
in Grutter cited numerous research studies and amicus curiae briefs that
demonstrated the educational benefits of a diverse student body, such as
improving academic learning, increasing students' satisfaction with college,
and promoting greater cross-racial understanding. ' 0
Yet, the opinions of the Court in Parents Involved and Grutter do not
reflect the only approaches taken in recent cases involving equal educational
opportunity. They contrast, for example, with the Court's decidedly different
tack in United States v. Virginia," a 1996 case addressing gender-based
segregation in higher education. The Virginia Court dismissed expert
testimony and scientific evidence in the trial court record that supported a
state's interest in maintaining a single-sex military academy. 12 Justice
Ginsburg's majority opinion concluded that the state's scientific evidence on
gender-based developmental differences and the benefits of single-sex
education reflected only generalizations about men and women, and could
not justify the exclusion of women from the Virginia Military Institute.
Why do these inconsistencies in the Justices' citation of science appear
in recent opinions? Do they reflect the validity or quality of the scientific
research? Do they mirror the Justices' divisions in ideology? Do they reflect
personal differences in jurisprudence and the appropriate uses of science in
constitutional interpretation? Or are they products of judicial rhetoric, with
Justices selectively employing-or ignoring-scientific research findings in
order to strengthen arguments that support a particular outcome? The
questions are significant, not only because they reflect judicial decision
making in some of the Court's most controversial cases, but because answers
7 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2820-24, 2837-42 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
8 Id. at 2776-81 (Thomas, J., concurring).
9 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
0 Id. at 330-31.
11518 U.S. 515 (1996).
12 Id. at 549-50.
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pointing in a particular direction can strongly influence both civil rights
advocacy and new lines of scientific research.
Drawing on Parents Involved and other recent equal protection cases,
this Article suggests that the differences among the Justices are products of
multiple factors, including weaknesses in constitutional fact-finding theory
and shifts in the framing of equal protection analyses. While this Articles
does not pretend that the courts will take significant steps to reconcile some
of the contradictions that have arisen in recent cases, it does propose that
modest changes in equal protection analysis can recalibrate judicial inquiries
and place research findings in a better position to inform constitutional
decision making.
The analysis proceeds in four parts. First, this Article discusses the
theoretical underpinnings of the courts' use of science in equal protection
litigation. This Article examines theories of fact finding and rules of
evidence, as well as critiques of scientific citations in equal protection
litigation, drawing on opinions starting with Brown v. Board of Education
and its well-known citation of psychological and sociological studies
documenting the harms of segregation-what the Brown Court labeled
"modem authority."' 13 Second, this Article examine a range of equal
protection cases and discuss how constitutional frameworks have shaped
both core constitutional values and the gathering of relevant constitutional
facts. Third, this Article examine in more detail the Parents Involved cases,
as well as the underlying science and the citation of studies by advocates.
This Article does not attempt to summarize the large body of scientific data
available to the Justices in these cases, but I do compare differences in the
presentation of the studies to help explain the inconsistent interpretations of
the research. 14 Finally, this Article propose that the courts reframe their equal
protection analyses to focus on key inquiries that can turn to evidence of
appropriate costs and benefits, and that the courts employ explicit evidentiary
standards to better inform their analyses of constitutional questions.
II. LAW AND SCIENCE IN CONSTITUTIONAL FACT FINDING
At first glance, the use of relevant facts and scientific findings to help
inform constitutional interpretation would seem uncontroversial. If the courts
base their decisions in part on social realities-in addition to constitutional
text, precedent, history, and other tools of constitutional analysis-should not
13 347 U.S. 483, 494 & n.1 1(1954).
14 1 rely on doctrinal analysis rather than scientific methods in examining recent case
law. For an empirical analysis of the uses of science in the Parents Involved case, see
Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, 21st Century Social Science on School Racial Diversity and
Educational Outcomes, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1173 (2008).
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the factual predicate on which they rely be as accurate and complete as
possible, and not be rooted in assumption, supposition, or legal fiction? The
answer is more complex than one might expect. Constitutional fact finding is
an underdeveloped element of constitutional interpretation and is
complicated by the absence of any formal procedural or evidentiary rules that
govern the introduction of constitutional facts. Scientific facts in particular
engender special problems because of methodological issues and
inconsistencies between scientific analyses and the judicial process. I address
some of the core questions and dilemmas of constitutional fact finding before
turning to a discussion of the Court's recent equal protection cases.
A. Theories of Fact Finding
Patterns of judicial fact finding have been bound by the dichotomy
between "adjudicative" and "legislative" facts. As first suggested by Kenneth
Culp Davis 15 and acknowledged in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 16
adjudicative fact finding refers to the process by which a court gathers
evidence used to resolve a specific dispute between parties to a lawsuit; these
facts are limited to the immediate parties and no laws are created or changed
in the process of adjudicating the dispute. Legislative fact finding, on the
other. hand, refers to the process by which a court, like a legislative body
gathering pertinent information to draft a statute, compiles more general facts
not simply to resolve a specific dispute but to establish legal principles that
apply to a range of individuals or institutions.17 Constitutional fact finding,
as I employ the term, is simply that subset of legislative fact finding in which
courts gather facts to inform the development of constitutional law.18
15 See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the
Administrative Process, 55 HARv. L. REv. 364 (1942).
16 FED. R. EviD. 201. The advisory committee's note to Rule 201 restates the core
difference between adjudicative and legislative facts: "Adjudicative facts are simply the
facts of the particular case. Legislative facts, on the other hand, are those which have
relevance to legal reasoning and the lawmaking process, whether in the formulation of a
legal principle or ruling by a judge or court or in the enactment of a legislative body."
FED. R. EviD. 201 advisory committee's note.
17 The distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts is justified by the
interest in effective judicial policy making. As the advisory committee's notes to the
Federal Rules of Evidence make clear: "[Jiudge-made law would stop growing if judges,
in thinking about questions of law and policy, were forbidden to take into account the
facts they believe, as distinguished from facts which are 'clearly ... within the domain of
the indisputable.' Facts most needed in thinking about difficult problems of law and
policy have a way of being outside the domain of the clearly indisputable." FED. R. EviD.
201 advisory committee's note.
18 David Faigman has suggested an additional division of constitutional facts into
two subcategories-"constitutional-rule" facts and "constitutional-review" facts:
2008] 1119
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Both adjudicative and legislative/constitutional facts are often necessary
to resolve a constitutional claim. For instance, in addressing whether a race-
conscious policy is constitutional, courts employ "strict scrutiny" and inquire
into whether the policy advances a compelling interest and whether it is
narrowly tailored to that interest. 19 A court must first determine what the
policy actually says, to whom it applies, and whether it reflects the true intent
of the. policy maker-a set of adjudicative facts. If a court has not already
determined that the interest is compelling, it can do so by assigning a value to
the interest, a value that can be informed by asking whether the interest
produces significant social benefits or prevents significant harms. For
instance, determining whether an interest in student body diversity in higher
education is compelling could rely on legislative facts showing that diversity
produces educational benefits and prevents harms such as racial stereotyping.
Several inquiries and facts may affect whether a policy is narrowly
tailored, including whether a policy is flexible, whether it is limited in time,
whether it unduly burdens third parties, and whether it has been weighed
against race-neutral alternatives. 20 For example, whether a particular policy
contains time limits or mechanisms for periodic review is an adjudicative
fact; the policy in question either does or does not contain the relevant
procedures and the court can assess whether it satisfies the constitutional
standard. On the other hand, whether a policy maker has engaged in "serious,
good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives ' 21 may require
facts that are both adjudicative (evidence that the policy maker at some point
actually considered a set of alternatives) and legislative (evidence of similar
types of policies, whether these policies have been workable in practice, and
whether they are more effective than race-conscious policies).
Constitutional-rule facts are advanced to substantiate a particular interpretation
of the Constitution. Constitutional-rule facts join the traditional sources of
authority-the text, original intent, precedent, constitutional scholarship, and
contemporary values-in establishing the meaning of the
Constitution.... Constitutional-review facts, on the other hand, embody the
more generally recognized function of legislative fact-finding in constitutional
cases. Courts examine constitutional-review facts under the pertinent
constitutional rule in order to determine the constitutionality of the state's
action.
David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding": Exploring the Empirical
Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 541, 553 (1991).
19 See, e.g., Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2751-52; Johnson v. California, 543 U.S.
499, 505-06 (2005); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326-27 (2003).
2 0 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334-43; United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171
(1987).
21 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339.
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Although differences can blur in practice-specific adjudicative facts
often have broad legislative effects in precedent-setting cases22-the
adjudicative-legislative fact distinction is methodologically critical because
adjudicative facts are subject to evidentiary rules governing matters such as
judicial notice23 and because a body of federal law addressing the
"gatekeeping" of expert testimony limits the entry of science-based
adjudicative facts into evidence. 24 Appellate courts normally accept findings
of adjudicative fact as given, and only second-guess lower court findings
when a review of the record suggests that the findings are clearly
erroneous. 25 Legislative or constitutional fact finding, however, carries no
such constraints.26 An appellate court is not bound by a trial court's findings
when conducting constitutional fact finding, and the court can rely on the
record, new information introduced by the parties on appeal, material
contained in amicus curiae briefs, findings and reports from other
governmental bodies, and their own research. 27
22 For example, in Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger, the specific selection
procedures for the race-conscious law school and undergraduate admissions policies at
the University of Michigan were adjudicative facts designed to show how the policies
worked in practice. In determining the constitutionality of the policies-upholding the
law school's policy for using race flexibly but striking down the undergraduate policy for
its mechanical uses of race-the Supreme Court established boundaries for what were
permissible admissions policies. A set of adjudicative facts had legislative-fact effects
because they were employed to produce broad rules of law applicable to university
policies nationwide.
23 See FED. R. EvID. 201 (judicial notice of adjudicative facts).
24 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589-98 (1993)
(outlining gatekeeping role of federal courts); FED. R. EVID. 702 (codifying Daubert
standard). Among the factors that trial courts must identify in trying to root out "junk"
science are (1) whether a scientific theory or technique has been tested and is falsifiable,
(2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication, (3) the standards
employed for a specific scientific technique and the technique's known rate of error, and
(4) the technique's general acceptance within a scientific community. Daubert, 509 U.S.
at 593-95. See generally 60 AM. JUR. Trials § 1 (2008) (The Daubert Challenge to the
Admissibility of Scientific Evidence).
25 FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact.., must not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to
judge the witnesses' credibility.").
26 See FED. R. EvID. 201 advisory committee's note ("[Rule 201] deals only with
judicial notice of 'adjudicative' facts. No rule deals with judicial notice of 'legislative'
facts.... The omission of any treatment of legislative facts results from fundamental
differences between adjudicative facts and legislative facts.").
27 The major limitation of this flexibility and open-endedness, however, is that many
of the filtering mechanisms inherent in a trial, including evaluating witness credibility
and cross-examining evidence, are not employed at the appellate court level.
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Consistent with the open-endedness of constitutional fact finding, the
Supreme Court and other appellate courts searching for constitutional facts
have not bound themselves by a set of evidentiary rules, nor do they rely on
well-settled burdens of proof, such as the preponderance-of-evidence
standard in civil cases or the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in criminal
cases. The Supreme Court is not required to test the validity of research
findings contained in amicus briefs or reports by other branches of
government, and constitutional tests that rely on factual predicates are often
vaguely worded and imprecise. Whether an abortion regulation imposes an
"undue burden" 28 or whether a governmental interest is a "compelling
interest" requires the government to offer evidence in defense of a challenged
policy, but the types of facts and the quantum of evidence needed to satisfy
these standards are not entirely clear. Any number of facts could be
considered germane to the constitutional question.
Despite its importance, constitutional fact finding has not engendered a
coherent jurisprudence or led the courts to self-police their use of
constitutional facts. As my introductory discussion of equal protection cases
suggests,29 courts may acknowledge key constitutional facts-such as
scientific findings on important educational and psychological benefits-but
those facts are not necessarily deployed in consistent ways: a judge may rely
significantly on constitutional facts (Grutter and Justice Breyer's dissent in
Parents Involved), a similar set of facts may lead to an altogether different
legal conclusion (Justice Thomas's concurrence in Parents Involved),
ostensibly relevant facts can be dismissed as beside the point (U.S. v.
Virginia), or facts can be omitted or ignored (Chief Justice Roberts's
plurality opinion in Parents Involved).30 As David Faigman has aptly
28 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992)
(plurality opinion) ("A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a
state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.").
29 See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
30 The inconsistency of constitutional fact finding has been well documented in
areas such as First Amendment law, criminal procedure, due process, and equal
protection law. A general survey of the case law is beyond the scope of this Essay, but is
addressed at length in DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LABORATORY OF JUSTICE (2004), and Dean M.
Hashimoto, Science as Mythology in Constitutional Law, 76 OR. L. REV. 111 (1997). A
historical treatment of equal protection cases suggests a serious inconsistency in the
Supreme Court's constitutional fact finding, see ANGELO N. ANCHETA, SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW 70-125 (2006), as does recent law
review literature examining a range of constitutional law fields, see, e.g., Faigman,
"Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding," supra note 18, at 584-87 (procedural due
process); Lloyd Jeglikowski, Note, The Implication of Prisoners' Rights Jurisprudence
on Racial Segregation in Prisons: The Normative Approach Gives Way to an Empirical
Analysis in Selecting a Standard of Review, 9 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 129, 152-57
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summarized it, "the Court's constitutional fact jurisprudence is erratic" and
"guided by no comprehensive vision anchored in constitutional theory." 31
The absence of a consistent theory of constitutional fact finding should
not be surprising, though, since there is no overarching theory of
constitutional interpretation that guides all of the judiciary. Judges differ
markedly on the emphases they place on constitutional text, precedent,
history, normative theories, legal scholarship, and other tools of
constitutional analysis. And even if a mode of constitutional interpretation
predominates, there is no guarantee that the fact-finding process will be
identical from issue to issue or from case to case.32 A judge employing an
originalist theory of interpretation, for example, may be content to rely on
textual exegesis and "original meaning" as the sole or primary sources of
interpretation, 33 and may engage in little or no fact finding on contemporary
social conditions. On the other hand, a judge favoring a balancing theory of
constitutional rights may conduct extensive fact finding and seek out
multiple sources of information in order to identify and weigh the various
interests to be balanced against each other.34
B. Science as Constitutional Fact
As a subset of constitutional facts, scientific research findings merit
special attention both because of the special attributes of scientific inquiry
and because of the historical role of science in major equal protection cases.
Brown v. Board of Education and its Footnote Eleven have produced the
most commentary, 35 but the complex issues generated by Brown resound in
an array of constitutional cases. Although Brown was not the first equal
protection case to invoke scientific findings, the Supreme Court made clear
(2007) (prisoners' rights); Shawn Kolitch, Comment, Constitutional Fact Finding and the
Appropriate Use of Empirical Data in Constitutional Law, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
673, 686-96 (2006) (criminal procedure).
31 FAIGMAN, LABORATORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 364.
32 See Steven I. Friedland, The Centrality of Fact to the Judicial Perspective: Fact
Use in Constitutional Cases, 35 CONN. L. REv. 91 (2002).
3 3 See ANTONN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997).
34 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96
YALE L.J. 943 (1987).
35 The literature is voluminous, but for a set of more recent analyses of the science in
Brown, see ANCHETA, supra note 30, 42-69; JACK M. BALKIN, WHAT BROWN V. BOARD
OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID 50-53 (2002); FAIGMAN, LABORATORY OF JUSTICE,
supra note 30, at 161-204; JOHN P. JACKSON, JR., SOCIAL SCIENTISTS FOR SOCIAL
JUSTICE: MAKING THE CASE AGAINST SEGREGATION (2001); Michael Heise, Brown v.
Board of Education, Footnote 11, and Multidisciplinarity, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 279
(2005); Sanjay Mody, Note, Brown Footnote Eleven in Historical Context: Social
Science and the Supreme Court's Quest for Legitimacy, 54 STAN. L. REv. 793 (2002).
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in Brown that school segregation deprived black children of equal
educational opportunities and that psychological and educational harms were
at the core of the constitutional injury: "To separate them from others of
similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling
of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."'36 The Court further stated:
"Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time
of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modem
authority. '37 Brown's Footnote Eleven underscored the Court's finding by
citing seven research studies that had been offered by the plaintiffs at trial
and in their appellate briefs. 38 Because of the cursory legal analysis in the
opinion-the Court cited only a few cases and considered the legislative
history of the Fourteenth Amendment to be inconclusive on the question of
public school segregation39-the science drew heightened attention in an
opinion designed more for public consumption than for an explication of
constitutional doctrine. Just how important the scientific findings were to the
Court's internal decision-making process remains uncertain,40 but whether
real or perceived, the centrality of science in the Brown opinion engendered
multiple questions and problems that remain relevant in contemporary
constitutional fact finding.
36 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. The Court also quoted at length from the Brown trial
court opinion: "Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a
detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the
sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as
denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation
of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to
(retard) the educational and mental development of Negro children and to deprive them
of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial(ly) integrated school system." Id.
3 7 Id. at 494-95.
3 8 Id. at 494 n.11.
39 Id. at 489-93.
40 See Mody, supra note 35 at 809-14 (comparing arguments on Court's reliance on
scientific evidence). It is impossible to confirm the Brown Court's internal decision-
making processes, but science likely played only a minor role in the Court's drafting of
the Brown opinion. Indeed, Chief Justice Warren was once quoted as saying that it was
"only a note, after all." RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 706 (1976). Moreover, the law
clerk responsible for preparing the footnote has stated that it "wasn't anything anybody
thought about, and nobody raised any question about it at the Court." ED CRAY, CHIEF
JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 285 (1997) (quoting Richard Flynn). The
Court's citation of "modem authority" in Brown seems largely designed to provide
support for refuting some of the factual predicates of Plessy v. Ferguson, namely that
separation of the races caused no harms and that inherent "racial instincts" and
"distinctions based upon physical differences" were beyond the pale of government
regulation. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
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One problem revolves around contingency-relying on science as a
primary authority to support a constitutional ruling. Putting stock in scientific
findings as a source of authority presumes that the findings will provide
useful and relevant information and that the findings have been generated
through valid scientific methods. Yet, the studies in Footnote Eleven have
been criticized for having methodological weaknesses and for not isolating
school segregation as the cause of the harm to black children.41 A leading
criticism of Brown is that the Court constructed its ruling not on a bedrock of
constitutional doctrine but on a "flimsy foundation" 42 of questionable
science. Moreover, because psychological and sociological research are
subject to updating and reformulation, relying on science could leave the
case open to being modified or even overruled if the key findings were to be
later refuted. As Edmond Cahn, a supporter of Brown, stated soon after the
decision:
Today the social psychologists ... are liberal and egalitarian in [their] basic
approach. Suppose, a generation hence, some of their successors were to
revert to the ethnic mysticism of the very recent past; suppose they were to
present us with a collection of racist notions and label them "science." What
then would be the state of our constitutional rights?43
Although it is doubtful that the Supreme Court would ever revisit Brown
because of new scientific research, 44 the problem is clear: constitutional
41 For instance, the well-known "doll study" conducted by Kenneth Clark, which
focused on the response of African-American children to white versus black dolls,
suffered from undersized samples and revealed data that actually contradicted the claim
that children in segregated schools had lower self-esteem and attributed stronger positive
qualities to the white dolls. Children in Northern schools actually preferred the white
dolls to the black dolls at a higher rate than children in Southern schools, which was a
finding inapposite to the plaintiffs' claim that segregation led to psychological harms. See
Edmund Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 161-65 (1955).
4 2 1d. at 157-58.
4 3 Id. at 167.
44 The lower federal courts confronted this problem less than ten years after Brown
in Stell v. Savannah-Chatman County Board of Education, 220 F. Supp. 667 (S.D. Ga.
1963), rev'd, 333 F.2d 55 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 933 (1964), where a federal
trial court refused to enjoin a Georgia school district from operating a segregated system
because scientific evidence presented by the defendants suggested that segregation did
not, contrary to the findings in Brown, cause harm to black students. The trial court even
went so far as to find that desegregation had caused more harm than good. Id. at 684. On
appeal, the Fifth Circuit rejected the trial court's reasoning, making clear that the lower
court was bound by Brown: "We do not read the major premise of the decision of the
Supreme Court in the first Brown case as being limited to the facts of the cases there
presented. We read it as proscribing segregation in the public education process on the
stated ground that separate but equal schools for the races were inherently unequal." 333
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principles can be destabilized if they are based largely on a factual predicate
that is subject to significant revision. 45
Additional problems revolve around the question of objectivity. The
utility of scientific information lies in its being produced through systematic
and objective methods that attempt to minimize bias. Yet, science cannot be
isolated from social context, and dominant ideologies can pervade both law
and scientific research. During the nineteenth century, physical differences
between blacks and whites, such as cranial dimensions and brain size, were
scientifically measured and chronicled, while theories of social evolution
were employed to enforce racial separation. 46 Consistent with the science of
the day, the Supreme Court's decision in Plessy v. Ferguson turned to
customs rooted in "racial instincts" to uphold segregation laws that merely
codified the natural order. 47 By the mid-twentieth century, however, as both
societal and scientific values evolved, a less discriminatory science emerged
that was consistent with the Brown Court's ruling.48 Nonetheless, issues of
objectivity continue to persist, and scientific research can still be questioned
for containing biases in the selection of questions and the methodologies
employed; in the worst cases, researchers can be accused of reaching only
those conclusions to which they may already be predisposed.
The adversarial process further complicates problems of objectivity. The
expert witnesses for the Brown plaintiffs worked closely with the civil rights
litigators and their clients to develop an extensive record of evidence, and the
researchers no doubt shared core values with the plaintiffs and their lawyers
in seeking to overturn the separate-but-equal doctrine. While affiliation does
F.2d 55, 61 (5th Cir. 1964). The Fifth Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court had
articulated an enduring principle that was not dependent on the adjudicative facts of
Brown or its companion cases.
45 A different problem arises when there is little or no scientific research bearing on
a constitutional question: in the absence of scientific findings, can a court's decision
command the same degree of legitimacy? The absence of an extant authority, whether it
is scientific, precedential, or historical, is unlikely to prevent a court from reaching a
conclusion of law, even if that conclusion is based on commonsensical knowledge, on
assumptions, or on suppositions yet unproved. Nonetheless, establishing a contingent
relationship between science and the law can lead an appellate court down different
procedural paths that can affect the outcome of a case-the court can render the decision
with the available information, it can order reargument to supplement the information, or
it can remand the case to augment the record.
4 6 See ANCHETA, supra note 30, at 20-27.
47 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
48 JACKSON, JR., supra note 35 at 17-59. Nonetheless, a countervailing "segregation
science" soon emerged after Brown and played roles in later litigation to defend Jim
Crow policies in education and other sectors of Southern life. See generally JOHN P.
JACKSON, JR., SCIENCE FOR SEGREGATION: RACE, LAW, AND THE CASE AGAINST BROWN
v. BOARD OF EDUCATION (2005).
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not necessarily imply bias in the science, the taint of partiality can arise if
research is sponsored by or entangled in advocacy efforts. And problems can
be even more serious in appellate advocacy, with the limited filtering that
occurs in constitutional fact finding. Appellate advocates, including amici
curiae, are not bound by assessments of credibility and cross-examination
that occur at trial, and can slant research findings in service of their core legal
arguments. 49
Another set of issues revolves around questions of judicial capacity. By
citing to science rather than precedent or legislative history, the Brown Court
"opened itself up to charges that it went beyond its own competence and may
have therefore misinterpreted the materials."50 The Court did not discuss the
scientific research in its opinion, so it is unclear whether the members of the
Court fully comprehended the strengths and weaknesses of the studies. But
even if the Brown Court's understanding of the research was accurate, the
underlying question persists: Given the technically complex and often
contested nature of scientific research, do courts have the competency and
capacity to invoke scientific findings in constitutional analysis?
Science and law operate in markedly different realms, and many of the
methods typical of scientific research-inductive reasoning, hypothesis
testing, probabilistic and statistical analyses--differ greatly from the methods
of lawyers and the judiciary, who are more accustomed to argumentation
rooted in clearly defined rights, narrative presentations of information, and
the adversarial process. 51 Indeed, most scientific studies are designed
primarily for other researchers as contributions to an aggregating literature,
and assessing studies and their methodologies critically-such as asking
49 For a recent example of extensive and competing amicus curiae briefs outside of
the equal protection context, see District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2854-61
(2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing competing empirical studies and briefs in the
area of gun control). In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, a case addressing limits on punitive
damage awards, Justice Souter noted in his majority opinion that the Court would not rely
upon a body of research examining the predictability of punitive awards because the
studies had been funded partly by Exxon, one of the parties. 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2626 n.17
(2008) ("The Court is aware of a body of literature... examining the predictability of
punitive awards by conducting numerous 'mock juries,' where different 'jurors' are
confronted with the same hypothetical case.... Because this research was funded in part
by Exxon, we decline to rely on it.") (citations omitted). It is unclear whether the
Supreme Court or the lower courts will presume in future litigation that litigant-funded
research, regardless of its soundness or quality, should not be relied upon because it may
be biased.
5 0 LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 42 (2000).
51 See Linda R. Tropp et al., The Use of Research in the Seattle and Jefferson
County Desegregation Cases: Connecting Social Science and the Law, 7 ANALYSES OF
SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL'Y 93, 109-14 (2007) (addressing differences in approaches
between judiciary and researchers).
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whether sampling techniques are sound, probing for selection biases, or
evaluating researchers' ultimate conclusions-can be daunting even for the
well-trained. 52 Yet, science's strength as a special source of knowledge
draws on its distinctiveness from law, drawing on methodologies that
ostensibly transcend the value-laden nature of litigation and appellate
advocacy. But if judges do not apprehend or carefully investigate the science,
or if they rely on the advocates' presentation of information with an
uncritical eye, scientific authorities may be errantly cited or dismissed.
Finally, because scientific information can carry special weight as an
extralegal authority, there is a danger that advocates and the courts will
invoke science solely for rhetorical purposes. Describing the science in
Brown, Scott Brewer has stated: "Writing in the third century in which
science enjoyed its ascendancy over religion as the dominant cultural
authority, the Court might reasonably have sought to invoke social-scientific
expertise to provide cultural authority for its profoundly controversial
decision. '53 Dean Hashimoto has similarly proposed that science's role in
constitutional law takes on largely mythological dimensions, with scientific
facts serving not as guides to particular results but as "reassuring symbols to
demonstrate that the legal rule is in harmony with our society's culture"; 54
the Brown Court could thus invoke "an empirical symbol that invited whites
to be helpful. It did not criticize whites for their biases, but invited sympathy
for the plight of black children." 55
Although rhetorical theories may accurately describe many legal
citations of science, the troubling implication is that the quality and
soundness of the underlying scientific findings can be irrelevant to their
citation; quoting science may serve only as an argumentum ad
verecundiam-a simple appeal to authority. And an equally serious problem
can arise if a court chooses to selectively ignore relevant research findings
that are unsupportive of a legal position, while citing others that are
supportive, even if all of the relevant studies are methodologically valid-
what might be called a "cherry picking" approach to citation. If the omitted
or discounted evidence is prominent and widely circulated, a court's
52 See David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social
Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1026-39 (1989).
53 Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107
YALE L.J. 1535, 1557 (1998); see also Mody, supra note 35, at 828 ("[T]he rise of social
science as an accepted discipline of knowledge was a background condition that formed
part of the Warren Court's perception of the world. The members of the Brown Court,
from this perspective, were themselves seduced by the exalted claims of social science in
the middle of the twentieth century. Footnote Eleven was a consequence of ordinary
human intuition, not grand strategy.")
54 Hashimoto, supra note 30, at 150.
55 Id at 143.
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disingenuousness in failing to cite relevant findings could undermine the
legitimacy of its ruling.
Despite these multiple dilemmas, scientific findings can and should play
important roles in reinforcing (or perhaps questioning) that legal precedents
and principles are still applicable, 56 in informing the values that animate
constitutional principles and theories, 57 and in answering specific inquiries
about social realities that can address central questions of constitutional
review. Science can offer relevant information beyond the specific limits of a
trial record and can expand anecdotal knowledge by adding wider and more
generalizable facts on the workings of groups and institutions. And while
problems of bias or incompleteness may be impossible to eliminate, scientific
findings can offer at least some degree of insight beyond what appears to be
commonsensical, hypothetical, or untested and suppositional. The danger, as
an analysis of cases such as Parents Involved can show, is that a
56 Precedent should not be supplanted by science, but relevant findings can help
determine whether a precedent should still be applicable to a new set of circumstances;
the scientific predicate might suggest a revision of precedent or simply distinguish it from
the present set of facts. For example, in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), the
Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment
banned the death penalty for crimes committed before a defendant was eighteen years of
age, overruling the Court's 1989 decision in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
In addition to citing recent changes in state capital punishment laws, as well as the latest
international developments, the Court turned to research findings to support its
conclusion that an evolving consensus should lead to the overruling of its previous
decision. Citing research studies addressing juvenile maturity and psychological
development, the Court concluded that juveniles were not the worst offenders in the
system and thus undeserving of capital punishment. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70.
57 The normative values that underlie a constitutional theory can also be informed by
science, since judicial perceptions of social realities can affect judges' values and norms.
As Deborah Jones Merritt has proposed, the Brown Court did not necessarily turn to
science for specific answers to constitutional questions, but scientific information was no
doubt part of an evolving process that changed the Justices' understanding of the
meaning of equal protection:
The journey may have included personal observation of racial interactions,
reflection on their own educational experience and that of their children,
consideration of contemporary and historical accounts of segregation, fresh
memories of a war in which odious racial classifications figured prominently,
philosophical musing about the nature of equality, resolution of prior challenges to
the separate-but-equal doctrine in higher education, and examination of a growing
body of social science literature documenting the effects of segregation. Social
science was but one of several strands weaving a picture of an unequal American
society. The composite picture pushed the Justices to embrace a new constitutional
theory.
Deborah Jones Merritt, Constitutional Fact and Theory: A Response to Chief Judge
Posner, 97 MICH. L. REv. 1287, 1293-94 (1999).
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constitutional framework can be so entrenched and rooted in core values that
even an informational role for science can be trumped by ideological
priorities. In the next Part, I examine the roles of science in some of the most
recent equal protection cases to determine both the latest direction of the
Supreme Court and the possibilities for change in forthcoming litigation.
III. SCIENCE AND EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
The dilemmas generated by Brown and other cases have led a number of
Supreme Court Justices to question the role of scientific evidence in equal
protection litigation, proposing that legislatures "are better qualified to weigh
and 'evaluate the results of statistical studies in terms of their own local
conditions and with a flexibility of approach that is not available to the
courts"', 58 and that "proving broad sociological propositions by statistics is a
dubious business, and one that inevitably is in tension with the normative
philosophy that underlies the Equal Protection Clause." 59 Yet, these concerns
have not significantly deterred the citation of scientific findings by advocates
or the courts. Scientific research continues to play a part in the fact finding of
leading equal protection cases, and Supreme Court decisions affecting school
desegregation,60 gender equality, 61 voting rights and redistricting, 62 criminal
procedure,63 prisoners' rights,64 age discrimination, 65 disability rights,
66
immigrants' rights, 67 and affirmative action policy68 have all contained
58 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 186 (1976)).
59 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (majority opinion of Brennan, J.).
60 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1,
413 U.S. 189 (1973).
61 See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (gender discrimination in
military registration); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S 484 (1974) (pregnancy
discrimination).
62 See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion County Elec. Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008) (right to
vote); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (political gerrymandering); Hunt v.
Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999) (racial gerrymandering).
63 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (racial discrimination in peremptory
challenges); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (racial discrimination in jury
selection).
64 See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005) (racial segregation in prison).
65 See Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (age discrimination
in employment).
66 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (rights of
mentally retarded); Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993) (rights of mentally ill).




opinions with multiple citations to scientific findings. In this Part, I discuss
the Supreme Court's treatment of science in the equal protection arena by
examining the underlying doctrine, the Justices' framing of equal protection
inquiries, and the deployment of scientific findings in a range of recent
decisions.
A. Fact Finding and Case Law
Courts engaging in constitutional fact finding69 can turn to science on
any of three levels of equal protection analysis: 70 (1) determining the nature
of a classification, (2) determining the appropriate standard of review-the
level of scrutiny applied to a particular classification, or (3) determining
68 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (affirmative action in higher
education).
69 The leading use of scientific evidence in adjudicative fact finding is to help
determine whether a constitutional violation has occurred. Statistical analyses are used to
prove both an injury caused by discrimination and to create an inference of
discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (peremptory
challenges in jury selection); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (overall jury
selection); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (school desegregation).
Scientific evidence can also be used to determine whether a government's interest in
remedying past discrimination is sufficiently compelling because it is grounded in a
"strong basis in evidence." See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909-10 (1996); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989). Evidence of past discrimination
must be extensive and tied directly to a government's actions; the requirement is typically
satisfied through a set of statistical and economic analyses covering several years of past
discrimination. Another use is to determine whether heightened review is triggered in the
first place; in race-conscious redistricting cases, the courts will apply strict scrutiny only
after race has been shown to be a predominant factor in drawing legislative district lines.
See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 241 (2001); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920
(1995). The question of whether race predominates can turn on regression analyses of
voting behavior and other statistical techniques that can isolate race from other
redistricting factors such as party affiliation and geography.
70 As a practical matter, fact finding only becomes a significant issue when the
courts are engaged in heightened review, employing either strict scrutiny or intermediate
scrutiny, which requires that a policy be substantially related to an important
governmental interest. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (discrimination
against unwed fathers); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (gender discrimination).
Most social and economic regulations are subject to the default standard of "rational
basis" review, and the courts presume their validity under a test in which a state interest
need only be legitimate and the challenged policy need only be rationally related to the
interest. See U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533-34 (1973). The test is so
lenient that "a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact finding and may be
based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data." FCC v. Beach
Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993).
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whether a governmental action satisfies the standard of review. 71 The
Supreme Court and other federal courts have relied on research findings in
determining that a national origin group, such as Mexican Americans, is a
classification deserving recognition under the Equal Protection Clause; 72 that
policies seeking to deny undocumented immigrant children access to a public
school education were subject to heightened scrutiny;73 that race-based
prison segregation policies were subject to strict scrutiny;74 and that
particular race-conscious policies in K-12 education75  and public
71 Modem equal protection doctrine has focused largely on judicial review of
governmental action that affects "suspect classes" or "semi-suspect" classes-group
classifications such as race, national origin, alienage, or gender that trigger heightened
scrutiny because of several key factors, including an extensive history of discrimination
against the group, their exclusion from the political process, and the immutability of a
classifying trait. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
In addition to suspect classes, certain fundamental rights, such as the right to vote and the
right to interstate travel, can trigger strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. See,
e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969) (right to vote);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (right to travel).
72 In Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954), the Court ruled that the exclusion of
Mexican Americans from criminal jury service violated the Equal Protection Clause. The
government defended its practices by arguing that because Mexican Americans were
classified as white there was no discrimination. Id. at 477. The Court disagreed, noting
that "community prejudices are not static, and from time to time other differences from
the community norm may define other groups which need the same protection." Id. at
478. Hemandez' brief documented longstanding discrimination against Mexican
Americans in jury selection as well as education, housing, property ownership,
employment, and access to public accommodations, and the Court consequently cited
studies to support its ruling that national origin, like race, is a protected class under the
Equal Protection Clause. See Brief for Petitioner, Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475
(1954) (No. 406), 1953 WL 78625.
73 In Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), the parties and amici curiae offered
extensive evidence addressing the costs of educating undocumented children, along with
economic analyses of the impact of undocumented immigrants in general. The Court
ultimately considered the costs of not educating undocumented children to support its
argument that the educational policies deserved heightened review; while strict scrutiny
was inappropriate because of the children's unlawful status, an intermediate standard
requiring that the state further a substantial interest was apt because of the social costs
and the important role of education in public life. Id. at 219-25.
74 In Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005), the Court addressed the question
of whether a temporary prison segregation policy was subject either to strict scrutiny,
because the segregation was on the basis of race and national origin, or to a more
deferential standard because it occurred in the context of prison administration. Ruling
that strict scrutiny should apply, the Court warned of the risks of segregation and cited
scientific research which suggested that segregation by race could exacerbate prisoner
violence. Id. at 507-08.
75 See Hunter v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1999)
(upholding race-conscious admissions policy to a university-affiliated "laboratory"
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employment 76 have advanced compelling interests in satisfaction of strict
scrutiny.
In Grutter,77 for example, scientific evidence was a central element of
the University's defense of its affirmative action policy from the earliest
stages, and was cited approvingly by the Supreme Court in upholding the
policy. The University offered several expert reports at trial to demonstrate
the educational benefits of diverse student bodies, along with statistical
analyses on the workings of the law school admissions process. The plaintiffs
relied on their own statisticians to attack the specific admission process, but
offered no research studies on the question of diversity and did not dispute
that racial diversity in a law school population could provide educational and
societal benefits. The trial court ultimately agreed with the plaintiffs'
analysis, although the judge acknowledged that the benefits of diversity were
"important and laudable." 78 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the trial
court in a majority opinion that relied on precedent-Justice Powell's
controlling opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke79 -
rather than science to uphold the diversity interest as compelling.80
school because it served a compelling interest in advancing educational research), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 877 (2000).
76 See Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding race-conscious
hiring policy for prison guards that favored black applicants because it served a
compelling interest in meeting the operational needs of effective prison administration),
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1111 (1997). The Wittmer court cited expert testimony in
concluding that "[t]he black lieutenant is needed because the black inmates are believed
unlikely to play the correctional game of brutal drill sergeant and brutalized recruit unless
there are some blacks in authority in the camp." Id. at 920. But see Lomack v. City of
Newark, 463 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 2006) (rejecting compelling interest in promoting racial
diversity among fire fighters and discounting educational and sociological benefits of
diversity).
77 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001), rev'd, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002), afd,
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
78 Id. at 850. The plaintiffs in the companion case of Gratz v. Bollinger similarly
conceded that diversity was "good, important, and valuable" but argued that it was also
"too limitless, timeless, and scopeless" to be compelling. 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 823 (E.D.
Mich. 2000), rev'd, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
79 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
80 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002). Among the dissenting and concurring opinions,
however, there was a serious colloquy over the scientific evidence, with a dissenting
judge arguing that the University's primary study was "questionable science.., created
expressly for litigation" that suffered from "profound empirical and methodological
defects," id. at 803-04 (Boggs, J., dissenting), and a concurring judge praising the same
study as "one of the most broad and extensive series of empirical analyses conducted on
college students in relation to diversity," id. at 761 (Clay, J., concurring) (internal citation
omitted).
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In the Supreme Court, numerous amicus curiae briefs containing
summaries of scientific research added to the record created at trial, but the
bulk of the citations to research studies were contained in briefs supporting
the University of Michigan, 81 while amicus briefs supporting the plaintiffs
focused largely on undercutting the university's expert witness reports. 82 In
ruling by a five-to-four vote that the law school admissions policy satisfied
strict scrutiny, the Grutter Court concluded that the University's interest in
promoting student diversity was a compelling interest. The Court did not rely
solely on scientific evidence to reach its conclusion-precedent and
constitutional facts from other amicus briefs, including ones from retired
military officers and major businesses addressing the importance of diversity,
were critical-but science played a prominent role in the Court's upholding
the diversity interest. The Grutter Court concluded that the law school's
admissions policy promoted cross-racial understanding, helped break down
stereotypes, and enabled students to understand individuals of different races.
The Court added that "[i]n addition to the expert studies and reports entered
into evidence at trial, numerous studies show that student body diversity
promotes learning outcomes, and 'better prepares students for an increasingly
diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them as professionals."' 83
Among the dissenting Justices, only Justice Thomas chose to criticize the
scientific findings by citing other literature: an opposing study on the
81 See Brief of Am. Educ. Research Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), available at 2003
WL 398292; Brief Amicus Curiae of the Am. Psychological Ass'n in Support of
Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) and Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516), available at 2003 WL 398321; Brief of the
Am. Sociological Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), available at 2003 WL 398313; Brief for the
Nat'l Ctr. for Fair & Open Testing (Fairtest) as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), available at 2003 WL 554400;
Brief Amicus Curiae of the Education Ass'n et al. in Support of Respondents, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003)
(No. 02-516), available at 2003 WL 400774; Brief of Soc. Scientists Glenn C. Loury et
al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)
(No. 02-241) and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516), available at 2003
WL 402129.
8 2 See Brief Amici Curiae of the Ctr. for Equal Opportunity et al. in Support of
Petitioner, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), available at 2002 WL
32101020; Brief for Amicus Curiae Nat'l Ass'n of Scholars in Support of Petitioners,
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), available at 2003 WL 144938.
83 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003).
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benefits of diversity and two additional studies on the achievement of black
students in historically black colleges and universities.8 4
Nevertheless, the courts' endorsement of science across a range of cases
is not fully consistent or easily predictable. 85 For instance, the Supreme
Court has noted, but ultimately discounted, scientific evidence in ruling that
classifications based on age86 and mental disability87 are not "suspect"
classifications deserving heightened scrutiny; that separate age restrictions
for men versus women in alcohol sales were not justified by statistics on
gender differences in alcohol usage and drinking-related accidents and
arrests;88 and that statistical evidence of significant racial disparities in death
84 Id. at 364-65 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia
did not cite to scientific research but criticized the findings in this way:
This is not, of course, an "educational benefit" on which students will be graded on
their law school transcript (Works and Plays Well with Others: B+) or tested by the
bar examiners (Q: Describe in 500 words or less your cross-racial understanding).
For it is a lesson of life rather than law-essentially the same lesson taught to (or
rather learned by, for it cannot be "taught" in the usual sense) people three feet
shorter and 20 years younger than the full-grown adults at the University of
Michigan Law School, in institutions ranging from Boy Scout troops to public-
school kindergartens.
Id. at 347 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
85 Empirical analyses of recent Supreme Court cases have not yielded any clear or
consistent patterns in the citation of scientific findings. See ROSEMARY J. ERICKSON &
RITA J. SIMON, THE USE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA IN SUPREME COURT DECISIONS (1998);
Henry F. Fradella, A Content Analysis of Federal Judicial Views of the Social Science
"Researcher's Black Arts, " 35 RUTGERS L.J. 103 (2003).
86 In Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976), the Court
upheld a mandatory retirement policy and discounted a body of findings on the long-
range ability of the elderly to continue contributing to society and the adverse effects of
prematurely removing them from the workforce. Instead, the Court employed the
commonsensical notion that everyone ages, and that the decline of certain physical and
mental skills are a normal consequence of aging. Id. at 314-315.
87 In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985), the Court
applied rational basis scrutiny to a classification based on mental retardation, even though
a significant number of studies offered by medical authorities, mental health
professionals, and research associations documented the vulnerabilities of the mentally
retarded and the harms caused by prejudice and past discrimination.
88 In Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), the Court struck down an Oklahoma law
setting a minimum age limit of eighteen for women and twenty-one for men for
purchases of certain alcoholic beverages. Although the state had offered statistical
evidence of differential rates of usage, accidents, and arrests, the Court concluded that
"the principles embodied in the Equal Protection Clause are not to be rendered
inapplicable by statistically measured but loose-fitting generalities concerning the
drinking tendencies of aggregate groups." Id. at 208-09.
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penalty sentencing did not implicate the Equal Protection Clause.89 Across a
number of cases, the Court and individual Justices have dismissed studies as
irrelevant or inconclusive, or have not cited science at all, even if when it
was an extensive part of the record and the appellate arguments. Consider
two examples: Loving v. Virginia, where the Supreme Court struck down one
of the last vestiges of Jim Crow segregation-anti-miscegenation laws
prohibiting marriages between whites and non-whites, and United States v.
Virginia, where the Court struck down the males-only admissions policy at
the Virginia Military Institute.
In Loving, all of the briefs for the parties and all but one of the amicus
curiae briefs contained scientific references addressing the purported harms
of racial intermarriage. 90 And even the one amicus brief that contained no
citations to specific scientific findings included a section entitled "The So-
Called Scientific Argument," which was designed to undermine the
petitioners' references to science by arguing that the science was
inconclusive. 91 Attorneys challenging the Virginia law offered extensive
references to works which showed that there were no biological harms
89 In MeCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), the Court rejected a death penalty
challenge by an African-American defendant who had been convicted of murdering a
white police officer. In support of his constitutional claims, McCleskey offered a
statistical study of Georgia death penalty cases which found that defendants whose
victims were white were 4.3 times more likely to receive a death sentence than
defendants whose victims were black. The Court acknowledged the validity of the study,
but ruled against McCleskey because the statistics did not demonstrate the state's intent
to discriminate against him specifically or that consideration of the victim's race had
actually tainted his trial. The Court concluded that such "disparities in sentencing are an
inevitable part of our criminal justice system." Id. at 312.
90 388 U.S. 1 (1967); 64 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 942 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard
Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS]. Among the amicus
briefs filed on behalf of the petitioners was one submitted on behalf of several Roman
Catholic bishops that contained not only theological sources but citations to
anthropological studies supporting intermarriage.
91 The state of North Carolina's amicus brief stated in part: "We do not enter into the
scientific realm on this question. There is no equalitarianism in the field of biology,
anthropology and geneticism. There is no certitude or concrete exactness in this field.
These so-called sciences have not yet reached the position or status of the exact sciences
one hundred and fifty years ago." Brief of the State of North Carolina as Amicus Curiae,
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395), reprinted in LANDMARKS BRIEFS AND
ARGUMENTS, supra note 90, at 958.
Later commenting on the problems of scientific bias, the brief stated: "You can
select books and treatises both pro and con on this question; one thing is sure and that is
neither cranial measurements, intelligence quotients nor statistical averages will ever




associated with intermarriage and mixed-race children. One study, a United
Nations report summarizing a body of literature, was quoted at oral
argument: "The biological data... stand in open contradiction to the tenets
of racism. Racist theories can in no way pretend to have any scientific
foundation." 92
Attorneys defending the Virginia law, noting that the weight of recent
biological science did not support their arguments, proposed that the
scientific evidence was inconclusive and that the Court should defer to the
wisdom of the legislature. 93 The state did, however, employ arguments
addressing the psychological and social harms of intermarriage, citing the
instability of individuals who entered into marriage, high divorce rates, and
the stigma suffered by children of interracial marriages. 94 Virginia's attorney
also quoted a study during oral arguments which had concluded that people
entering into interracial marriages suffered from a "rebellious attitude," as
well as "self-hatred, neurotic tendencies, immaturity, and other detrimental
psychological factors." 95
However the Supreme Court may have evaluated the scientific claims in
chambers, the unanimous opinion in Loving cited no science, relying instead
on clear violations of constitutional doctrine. The Court noted the state's
argument that the scientific evidence was "substantially in doubt 96 but went
no further in discussing it because of the anti-miscegenation law's
unambiguous failure to satisfy strict scrutiny. The Court stated: "There is
patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial
discrimination which justifies this classification. The fact that Virginia
prohibits only interracial marriages involving white persons demonstrates
92 Id. at 990 (quoting a statement by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization).
93 Loving, 388 U.S. at 8. The brief for Virginia stated:
If this Court (erroneously, we contend) should undertake such an inquiry, it
would quickly find itself mired in a veritable Serbonian bog of conflicting
scientific opinion upon the effects of interracial marriage, and the desirability of
preventing such alliances, from the physical, biological, genetic,
anthropological, cultural, psychological and sociological point of view.
Brief and Appendix on Behalf of Appellee, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No.
395), reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 90, at 834.
94 Oral Argument of Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395), reprinted in
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 90, at 988.
95 Id.
9 6 Loving, 388 U.S. at 8.
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that the racial classifications must stand on their own justification, as
measures designed to maintain White Supremacy. '97
In United States v. Virginia,98 scientific evidence was a key element of
the state's defense of its higher education policy, but the findings were
ultimately rejected as irrelevant by the Supreme Court in a seven-to-one vote.
In reviewing the males-only admissions policy at the Virginia Military
Institute, the district court had employed an intermediate scrutiny analysis
typically applied to gender classifications and required that the policy be
substantially related to an important governmental interest.99 During a six-
day trial, the court took scientific evidence introduced by the Commonwealth
that addressed the question of the government's interests in providing diverse
educational opportunities throughout the state system (including a single-sex
military institution) and maintaining VMI's unique "adversative" model of
education, which featured "[p]hysical rigor, mental stress, absolute equality
of treatment, absence of privacy, minute regulation of behavior, and
indoctrination in desirable values .... "100
The trial court found credible the scientific evidence of gender-based
developmental differences and the expert testimony on the likely changes to
the VMI's pedagogy that would result from coeducation, and the court
upheld the single-sex admissions policy under intermediate scrutiny.' 0 On
appeal, the Fourth Circuit accepted the trial court's factual findings and cited
a number of additional studies to justify single-sex education, 102 but reversed
the trial court on the law, requiring that the lower court examine the
possibilities for a remedy in which women could receive a comparable, but
still separate, military education. In light of the lower court rulings, Virginia
chose to establish a special women-only military education program at a
private women's college.
On appeal, the Supreme Court employed an elevated intermediate
scrutiny test that required an "exceedingly persuasive justification"'1 3 in
9 7 1d. at 11.
98 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
99 Id. at 533.
100 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1421 (W.D. Va. 1991).
101 Id. at 1434-43.
102 976 F.2d 890, 897-98 (4th Cir. 1992).
103 518 U.S. at 531 (1996). As Justice Rehnquist noted in his concurrence in US. v.
Virginia, in prior gender discrimination cases, the term "exceedingly persuasive" was not
used as an actual test, but as a term to describe the difficulty of meeting intermediate
scrutiny: "While terms like 'important governmental objective' and 'substantially
related' are hardly models of precision, they have more content and specificity than does
the phrase 'exceedingly persuasive justification.' That phrase is best confined, as it was
first used, as an observation on the difficulty of meeting the applicable test, not as a
formulation of the test itself." Id. at 559 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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order to ensure that stereotypes and generalizations were not at the heart of
an exclusionary policy. Casting aside arguments in a number of amicus
curiae briefs' 04 and the district court's findings-so much so that the term
"findings" was placed into quotation marks-Justice Ginsburg's majority
opinion concluded that the expert testimony and studies on gender-based
developmental differences only revealed general tendencies about men and
women, and could not be used to justify the exclusion of women who might
choose to attend and could thrive under the VMI's adversative model.10 5
Justice Ginsburg further concluded that the adversative model would not,
contrary to expert testimony, be harmed by the admission of women; she
considered such a judgment "hardly proved, a prediction hardly different
from other 'self-fulfilling prophecies,' once routinely used to deny rights or
opportunities."' 1 6 Consequently, the Court ruled that the state had not
satisfied the "exceedingly persuasive justification" standard and that women
would have to be made eligible for admission to VMI. Writing in dissent,
Justice Scalia adopted a position that was considerably more deferential to
the trial court and accepting of the scientific facts, upbraiding the majority
for ignoring the lower court's findings: "How remarkable to criticize the
District Court on the ground that its findings rest on the evidence (i.e., the
testimony of Virginia's witnesses)! That is what findings are supposed to
do."1 07
B. Facts and Framing
Grutter, Loving, and US. v. Virginia span multiple Court eras and cover
different equal protection standards and types of evidence, so direct
comparisons between the three cases are difficult. Yet, the contrasts in their
approaches to scientific findings are evident. The Loving Court's opinion
104See, e.g., Amici Curiae Brief of Women's Schools Together, Inc. et al. in
Support of Respondents at *10-27, United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1995) (Nos.
94-1941, 94-2107), available at 1995 WL 761812; Brief of Amici Curiae Independent
Women's Forum et al. in Support of Respondents at *4-15, United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515 (1995) (Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107), available at 1995 WL 745003; Brief
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents by Dr. Kenneth E. Clark et al. at *4-13, United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1995) (Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107), available at 1995 WL
744995. But see Brief Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner by the Am. Ass'n of
University Professors et al. at *2-28, United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1995)
(Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107), available at 1995 WL 702833 (containing extensive citations to
scientific literature, but taking position that the scientific literature was not conclusive
and offered only generalizations on male-female learning differences).
105 United States. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 541-42.
106 Id. at 542-43 (citation omitted).
107 Id. at 585 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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relied entirely on legal grounds for its repudiation of anti-miscegenation
laws, but implicitly dismissed Virginia's empirical arguments. The VMI case
yielded an explicit rejection of empirical data that Justice Ginsburg found
largely irrelevant to the question of gender exclusion, since the studies
offered by the state focused on generalized differences between men and
women rather than the suitability of women who chose to attend VMI. And
the Grutter Court relied on scientific research that supported its legal
conclusion that concrete educational benefits accrued because of student
body diversity, making the interest sufficiently compelling.
A tempting explanation for the differences is that the citation of scientific
findings is largely outcome-driven, and that the Justices are only using
science instrumentally and rhetorically. In other words, when scientific
findings align with a legal conclusion that is reached through other criteria,
including personal policy preferences and ideological grounds, the findings
are cited; but when the science does not align with the end result, it is treated
as inconclusive or irrelevant-or it is ignored altogether. A rhetorical theory
can provide partial explanations for many Supreme Court opinions, but
attributing the citation of science solely to judicial rhetoric offers only
limited insights into the relationships between equal protection norms and
fact finding; nor does it provide prescriptive guidance for the courts on how
to better structure their uses of science in constitutional litigation.
An alternative analysis to help understand recent case law is an approach
focusing on the framing of constitutional inquiries and fact finding. In
suggesting a framing analysis, 108 I start with the proposition that
constitutional interpretation is not solely driven by law or by ideology, but is
fueled by problem solving approaches in which the courts rely on broad
constitutional frameworks that include appropriate factual inquiries to fill
gaps in knowledge. These frameworks yield constitutional meaning-a
particular interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause-as well as holdings
and the language of opinions in specific cases. In employing the term
"constitutional framework," I refer not only to constitutional text and
precedent, but to a general structure that judges employ to approach a
108 In using the term "framing analysis" I am relying on a large and varied literature
that covers areas of cognitive science, media studies, and other fields and am adapting it
to constitutional analysis. I draw on Erving Goffman's seminal conceptualization of
"frame analysis," see ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE
ORGANIZATION OF EXPERJENCE (1974), as well as more recent treatments of the field, see,
e.g., FRAMING PUBLIC LIFE: PERSPECTIVES ON MEDIA AND OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE
SOCIAL WORLD (Stephen D. Reese et al. eds., 2001). For other recent examples of
framing in law and legal advocacy, see Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification
Theory and Research: Implications for Law, Legal Advocacy, and Social Justice, 94 CAL.
L. REV. 1119, 1149-55 (2006); Cheryl I. Harris, Whitewashing Race: Scapegoating
Culture, 94 CAL. L. REV. 907, 932-40 (2006).
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recurring type of problem and to reach a legal conclusion based on relevant
facts. A framework will typically incorporate the text and rules established
by precedent, but it also includes core values, theories, and interpretive
approaches to the law. In this sense, a framework is broader than an
individual jurisprudence or an ideological basis for decision making, because
it can incorporate appropriate fact finding into addressing a constitutional
problem. 109
A framing analysis suggests that constitutional frameworks can
determine factual inquiries-or, in some instances, can dictate when little or
no further factual inquiry is necessary. The most basic facts, of course,
trigger certain frameworks in the first place: a court must know, for example,
that a case involves a governmental racial classification in order to invoke an
equal protection framework. But additional fact finding, whether it is
adjudicative or legislative/constitutional, can be structured through the
framework. Based on the most elemental facts of Grutter, for instance, all of
the Supreme Court Justices employed a frame that the race-conscious
Michigan admissions policy should be analyzed as an equal protection
problem triggering heightened scrutiny. The Grutter trial court also adopted a
basic strict scrutiny framework and conducted extensive adjudicative fact
finding on the mechanics of the policy's use of race at trial; expert testimony,
including scientific evidence, was also taken at trial as constitutional facts
relevant to the question of whether the university's interest in diversity was
compelling.
Beyond recognizing that strict scrutiny had been triggered, however, the
majority and the dissenting Justices differed on the specific framework to
apply to the policy. Justice O'Connor and the other members of the Grutter
majority employed a deferential form of strict scrutiny rooted in the context
of higher education and the attendant interest in academic freedom.I 10 More
specifically, Justice O'Connor framed the core strict scrutiny questions
around a balancing test in which the compelling interest inquiry focused on
the benefits of student body diversity and the narrow tailoring inquiry
focused on the costs borne by individual applicants because of procedures
109 Refriaming or frame "shifting" may be possible, but may only be triggered by
significant changes in the law, such as an amendment to the Constitution or a precedent-
reversing case, which require a judge to adopt a revised constitutional frame. Changes in
fundamental values over time may also yield frame shifts: the evolution of the Supreme
Court's approach to racial segregation from Plessy to Brown provides one example, as do
recent cases in which the Court has reversed earlier precedents because of the evolution
of societal values. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (overruling previous
case law on juvenile death penalty); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling
previous case law on sodomy statutes).
I 10 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327-29.
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that could be too inflexible or that weighted race too heavily.", Under a
cost-benefit analysis, evaluating the benefits of diversity meant a turn to
empirical information, available in the trial court record and in amicus curiae
briefs containing both scientific and anecdotal information from a range of
sources. Deferring to the university, the majority concluded that the costs of
the policy would be minimal because they allowed non-minority applicants
to compete fully with minority applicants who might receive a "plus"
because of race.
In their dissenting opinions in Grutter, Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Kennedy each employed a strict scrutiny inquiry that paralleled the
balancing elements of Justice O'Connor's frame, but one that was
considerably more skeptical and exacting. 112 Justice Kennedy agreed with
the majority that consistent with precedent, an interest in student body
diversity, when supported by empirical evidence, could be compelling
because it furthered a university's educational task. 13 Focusing on the
narrow tailoring, however, both the Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy would
have struck down the policy. They each concluded that, as revealed through
the trial court's adjudicative fact finding on multi-year admissions statistics,
the policy in practice operated as a means to obtain consistent percentages of
minority group enrollments. Within the Rehnquist and Kennedy dissents, the
policy only advanced "racial balancing" designed merely to obtain
proportionality for proportionality's sake.
The frameworks of Justices Thomas and Scalia in Grutter were even
more unyielding, and for all practical purposes would have categorically
prohibited any race-conscious admissions policy, with little need for
constitutional fact finding. Justice Thomas's strict scrutiny analysis, for
instance, refrained the compelling interest requirement as a "pressing public
necessity"' 14-alluding to earlier Supreme Court language on national
security interests during wartime-and recast the university's interest not as
one focusing on educational benefits, but merely "in offering a marginally
superior education while maintaining an elite institution."' 15  The
framework's standard of review thus became virtually impossible to satisfy,
and the interest was devalued without any need for significant fact finding on
educational benefits.
111 See Michelle Adams, Searching for Strict Scrutiny in Grutter v. Bollinger, 78
TUL. L. REv. 1941 (2004) (comparing cost-benefit analyses and "smoking out" analyses
in Grutter v. Bollinger).
112 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 378 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id at 387 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
113 Id. at 387-88 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
1 14 Id. at 351 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
115 Id. at 356.
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Examining Loving v. Virginia and United States v. Virginia through a
framing lens analysis also suggests that highly exacting and categorical
frameworks can lead to the discounting of constitutional facts. In Loving, the
Court employed a strict scrutiny standard that reflected the apex of the
Court's "'strict' in theory, fatal in fact" approach to racial classifications that
burden racial minority groups. 116 The Court did not cite any of the state's
scientific evidence, but its strict scrutiny language clearly repudiated any
claims that the state had to the legitimacy of their interest in preventing the
psychological or social harms of intermarriage. In US. v. Virginia, Justice
Ginsburg employed a "skeptical scrutiny" 117 analysis that framed the equal
protection inquiry as a test that was closer in both form and substance to
high-level strict scrutiny; indeed, the scrutiny was so skeptical that it was
unyielding to facts that were inconsistent with the full inclusion of women at
the Virginia Military Institute. In essence, a value-focused framework of
gender integration was so strong that it went beyond merely casting aside the
scientific evidence as inapt or irrelevant. Justice Ginsburg's opinion was
openly averse to the trial court's findings.
In identifying these cases as examples, I do not imply that a framing
analysis can explain the fact finding in every recent equal protection case.
Nor do I suggest that framing is a deliberate and predictable strategy
employed by the Justices-as opposed to an analytical lens through which
opinions and arguments can be assessed. I simply propose that examining
case law through framing analyses provides particular insights into how the
courts can link values, law, and fact finding. In the next Part, I apply a
framing analysis in more detail to the Parents Involved cases.
IV. SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AND PARENTS INVOLVED
The Parents Involved cases reflect significant differences in the framing
of constitutional arguments and reliance on scientific evidence to answer key
inquiries under strict scrutiny. These differences are found in multiple
dimensions in three stages of the litigation: (1) the parties' arguments and
evidence at trial; (2) the legal arguments and summaries of scientific research
contained in amicus curiae briefs; and (3) the Supreme Court Justices'
citations of scientific evidence and their responses to the equal protection
claims.
116Loving, 388 U.S. at 11-12; see Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search Of
Evolving Doctrine On A Changing Court: A Model For A Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972) (proposing that Supreme Court's equal protection
jurisprudence of the 1960s and early 1970s was "a scrutiny that was 'strict' in theory and
fatal in fact").
117 518 U.S. at 515, 531.
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A. Science in the Lower Courts
The plaintiffs' challenges to the voluntary desegregation plans in Seattle
and Louisville represented claims asserting an individual right to choose
one's school without race being used as a factor-a strong color-blind
framework paralleling earlier challenges to race-conscious affirmative action
plans in cases such as Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger. In the
Seattle litigation, both the plaintiffs and the school district relied on expert
reports that were submitted in conjunction with their applications for
summary judgment before the district court.118 To support the school
district's argument that its interests in promoting racial diversity and
reducing the effects of racial isolation were compelling, the district's expert
identified four categories of research which showed that racial diversity
produced social and educational benefits, including (1) greater educational
opportunities and achievement, (2) improved academic achievement, and
critical thinking skills, (3) improved race relations and civil values, and (4)
increased employment opportunities in racially diverse settings. 119 The
plaintiffs' expert disagreed with the conclusions of the school district's
expert that the scientific evidence was conclusive on producing significant
academic and social benefits, but did acknowledge that "[t]here is general
118 137 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1236-38 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
119 As quoted by the district court, the declaration of Dr. William T. Trent stated in
relevant part:
[1.] Opportunity and achievement. The research shows that a desegregated
educational experience opens opportunity networks in the areas of higher education
and employment, particularly for minority students, which do not develop when
students attend less integrated schools....
[2.] Teaching and learning. The research shows that academic achievement of
minority students improves when they are educated in a desegregated school, likely
because they have access to better teachers and more advanced curriculum. The
research also shows that both white and minority students experienced improved
critical thinking skills-the ability to both understand and challenge views which are
different from their own-when they are educated in racially diverse schools.
[3.] Civic values. The research clearly and consistently shows that, for both white
and minority students, a diverse educational experience results in improvement in
race-relations, the reduction of prejudicial attitudes, and the achievement of a more
democratic and inclusive experience for all citizens.... Recent research has
identified the critical role of early school experiences in breaking down racial and
cultural stereotypes...
[4.] Employment. Research ... shows that, as a group, minority students who exited
desegregated high schools were more likely to be employed in a racially diverse
workplace, obtained more prestigious jobs than those who did not, and that their





agreement by both experts and the general public that integration is a
desirable policy goal mainly for the social benefit of increased information
and understanding about the cultural and social differences among the
various racial and ethnic groups. ' 120 The district court ultimately concluded
that the school district's interests were indeed compelling based on the expert
reports.
In contrast, the Louisville case did not involve competing claims of
scientific experts. 121 The defendant school district offered several witnesses
at trial, including two experts, who testified in support of key constitutional
facts, including core findings comparable to those in the Grutter case:
[I]n a racially integrated learning environment, students learn tolerance
towards others from different races, develop relationships across racial lines
and relinquish racial stereotypes.... [T]hese students are better prepared
for jobs in a diverse workplace and exhibit greater social and intellectual
maturity with their peers in the classroom and at their job.122
The plaintiffs' argument rested primarily on the assertion that the
Louisville voluntary desegregation plan was an illegal racial quota; 123 the
plaintiffs offered neither witnesses nor arguments against the proposition that
racially integrated schools were valuable. Consequently, the district court
accepted as fact that integrated schools strengthen and make an entire school
system more attractive. "To find otherwise," the district court concluded,
"would require the Court to ignore every bit of testimony on the subject."'124
Both the Seattle and Louisville trial court decisions were affirmed by
federal courts of appeals, with the Sixth Circuit offering a short per curiam
opinion in full agreement with the trial court's opinion, 125 and the Ninth
Circuit's en banc opinion approvingly citing the school district's expert
120 Id. (quoting the deposition of Dr. David J. Armor).
121 McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 854 n.39 (W.D.
Ky. 2004).
122 Id. at 853.
123 Id. at 857.
124 Id. at 854 n.40.
125 McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005). One
amicus curiae brief in the Sixth Circuit focused on scientific evidence on the benefits of
diversity and the harms of racial isolation. See Brief of the Civil Rights Project at
Harvard University as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellees and
Affirmance of the Judgment of the District Court at *18-22, McFarland v. Jefferson
County Pub. Sch., 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-5897), available at 2004 WL
5151650.
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witness report on the question of compelling interest. 126 In dissent, however,
one Ninth Circuit judge offered a preview of the framework differences that
would surface in the Supreme Court. Judge Bea, joined by three members of
the en banc panel, made clear that he found the fact finding of the lower
court to be inadequate and the scientific evidence in support of the Seattle
school district to be lacking: "The sociological evidence presented by the
District suggests that some benefits will. accrue from racial balancing. To me,
evidence of some benefits does not satisfy the District's burden of proving a
compelling governmental interest, especially in light of the Supreme Court's
frequent pronouncements that racial balancing itself is unconstitutional."' 127
B. Amicus Curiae Briefs
Briefs that were filed in the Supreme Court appeals of the Seattle and
Louisville cases reflected major differences in both the legal positions and
the scientific opinion regarding the educational benefits of racially diverse
schools. Nearly one half of the sixty-plus amicus curiae briefs filed in the
cases, as well as the Petitioners' reply brief in the Louisville case, contained
significant citations to scientific evidence. 128 Six amicus briefs in particular
-two filed on behalf of the plaintiffs and four filed on behalf of the school
districts--devote most of their space to highlighting and summarizing bodies
of research: the brief of David J. Armor, Abigail Thernstrom, and Stephan
Thernstrom 129 and the brief of John Murphy, Christine Rossell, and Herbert
Walberg 130 were filed on behalf of the Petitioners challenging the district
126 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1174-
75 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). Only one amicus curiae brief filed in the Ninth Circuit
offered scientific findings at any great length. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Am. Civil
Liberties Union in Support of Appellee Seattle School District No. 1 at * 17-27, Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005) (No.
01-35450), available at 2001 WL 34644525.
127 Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1209 (Bea, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
128 See National Academy of Education Committee on Social Science Research
Evidence on Racial Diversity in Schools, Race-Conscious Policies for Assigning Students
to Schools: Social Science Research and the Supreme Court Cases (Robert L. Linn &
Kevin G. Welner eds., 2007), available at http://www.naeducation.org/
Meredith_Report.pdf [hereinafter Linn & Welner].
129 Brief of David J. Armor, Abigail Thernstrom, and Stephan Thernstrom as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at *9-29, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (Nos. 05-908, 05-915), available at 2006 WL
2453607.
130 Brief of Amici Curiae Drs. Murphy, Rossell and Walberg in Support of
Petitioners at *5-17, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127
S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (Nos. 05-908, 05-915), available at 2006 WL 2459104.
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plans; the brief of 553 Social Scientists,' 3' the brief of the American
Educational Research Association, 132  the brief of the American
Psychological Association and the Washington State Psychological
Association, 133 and the brief of Amy Stuart Wells et al. 134 were filed on
behalf of the Respondent school districts. 135 The major debate among the
briefs revolved around the question of educational benefits associated with
diverse schools, with more limited attention to narrow tailoring questions
such as the effectiveness of race-neutral alternatives.
The opposing sets of amicus briefs are illuminating both for the explicit
legal stances taken in support of the parties and the major disagreements in
their interpretation of the applicable scientific literature. For example, the
Armor, et al. brief took a position opposing the Court's recognizing
compelling interests beyond the interests in remedying past discrimination
and in promoting of diversity in higher education, 136 while the Murphy, et al.
brief more explicitly suggested overruling or seriously limiting Grutter.137
On the other hand, the brief for the American Educational Research
131 Brief of 553 Soc. Scientists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at *4,
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (Nos.
05-908, 05-915), available at 2006 WL 2927079. The 553 Social Scientists brief was
lengthier than other briefs and contained many more summaries and citations because the
brief summarized the findings in an appendix rather than in the body of an argument. The
literature summaries in the briefs appendix took up 54 pages.
132 Brief of the Am. Educ. Research Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents at *5-17, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127
S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (Nos. 05-908, 05-915), available at 2006 WL 2925967.
133 Brief for Amici Curiae The Am. Psychological Ass'n and the Washington State
Psychological Ass'n in Support of Respondents at *5-27, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch.
v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (Nos. 05-908, 05-915), available at
2006 WL 2927084.
134 Brief of Profs. Amy Stuart Wells, Jomills Henry Braddock I, Linda Darling-
Hammond, Jay P. Heubert, Jeannie Oakes and Michael A. Rebell and the Campaign for
Educ. Equity as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at *5-29, Parents Involved in
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, (Nos. 05-0908, 05-915), available
at 2006 WL 2927074.
135 Amicus David J. Armor had also served as the expert for the plaintiffs in the
Seattle litigation, while William T. Trent, the expert for the Seattle school district, and
Gary Orfield, an expert for the Louisville school district, were among the signatories to
the 553 Social Scientists brief.
136 See Brief for David J. Armor, supra note 129, at *6 (point headings stating "The
Court has Properly Found Very Few Asserted State Interests to be Compelling" and
"Grutter Does Not Resolve the Issues in these Cases").
13 7 See Brief of Amici Curiae John Murphy, M.D. et al., supra note 130, at *8 ("In
this case, the Court has a chance to refortify the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment,
either by overruling Grutter or by making clear that it applies only in the context of
higher education.").
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Association proposed that a compelling interest in racial diversity in K-12
education implicitly followed from the educational diversity interest
recognized in Grutter,138 and the brief for Wells, et al. recommended
applying a lower standard review than strict scrutiny in the Parents Involved
cases. 139
The differences in the citation of research studies and the general
interpretations of the broad bodies of scientific literature are even more
striking. For instance, the Armor, et al. brief proposed that a "comprehensive
review of the literature" revealed that "[t]here is no evidence of a clear and
consistent relationship between desegregation and academic achievement,
which is the primary purpose of universal public education.... When
averaged over large numbers of studies, the effects are generally weak or
nonexistent." 140 Moreover, the brief suggested that there was no evidence of
a clear and consistent relationship "between desegregation and such long-
term outcomes as college attendance, occupational status, and wages" or
"between racial balance in K-12 schools and such social outcomes as racial
attitudes, prejudice, race relations, and inter-racial contact. '141
In contrast, the 553 Social Scientists brief contained point headings and
summaries of the scientific literature-spanning fifty-four pages in the
briefs appendix-that identified multiple benefits associated with racial
diversity and multiple harms associated with racial isolation:
* Racial Integration Promotes Cross-Racial Understanding and Reduces
Racial Prejudice
* Racial Integration Improves Critical Thinking Skills and Academic
Achievement
* Racial Integration Improves Life Opportunities
* Racially Integrated Schools Better Prepare Students for a Diverse
Workforce, Reduce Residential Segregation, and Increase Parental
Involvement in Schools
* Racial Isolation is Associated with Higher Teacher Turnover and
Lower Teacher Quality
* Racially Isolated Schools Have Concentrated Educational
Disadvantages
138 See Brief for Am. Educ. Research Ass'n, supra note 132, at *5 ("Like the
benefits of diversity in higher education, the benefits of diversity in elementary and
secondary education are 'not theoretical but real."').
139 See Brief of Profs. Amy Stuart Wells et al., supra note 134, at *2 ("Amici note,
however, that the plans are not the kind of race-based policies that treat people of
different races differently and therefore trigger strict scrutiny; rather, the plans are the
kind of local, positive integration effort that the Court expressly has endorsed.").




" Racial Isolation Limits Access to Peers Who Can Positively Influence
Academic Learning
* Racial Isolation is Associated with Lower Educational Outcomes 142
The brief for the American Educational Research Association, in
addition to citing multiple research findings, also rebutted the arguments of
the Petitioners' amici and contained multiple footnotes criticizing the Armor,
et al. and Murphy et al. amicus briefs for their "incomplete analyses of the
literature, critiques of well-established scientific methodologies, and reliance
on studies that are outdated or inconsistent with more recent research."'1 43
The dichotomies between the scientists in Parents Involved show that the
framing of constitutional arguments and supporting scientific evidence
occurred at the appellate advocacy level, even before the Justices directly
addressed the constitutionality of the plans. The legal arguments in the
various scientific amicus briefs differ little from those in the parties' briefs or
other amicus briefs, and the citation of science is designed largely to support
those arguments. The amicus briefs supporting the plaintiffs are consistent
with a legal framework that treats race-conscious policies as categorically
unconstitutional "racial balancing" and treats the scientific evidence as
indeterminate. The amicus briefs for the defendant school districts adopt a
framework that is considerably more permissive of race-conscious measures
and cite multiple studies that tip the balance strongly in favor of those
measures.
As one analysis of the Parent Involved amicus briefs has shown, the
research literature was certainly not unanimous in supporting a racial
diversity interest, but the volume of studies and the breadth of support among
researchers for the positive benefits of diversity weighed much more heavily
in favor of the school districts. 144 Yet, only the four dissenting Justices in
Parents Involved adopted a framework that considered the findings relevant
and supportive of the compelling interest argument.
C. Science and the Parents Involved Court
The opinion of the Parents Involved Court-comprising those sections of
Chief Justice Roberts's plurality opinion joined by Justice Kennedy-makes
clear that the race-conscious assignment policies employed by the Seattle and
142 Brief for 553 Soc. Scientists, supra note 131, at *i-ii. Similarly, a strongly-
worded heading in the Wells et al. brief stated: "Social Science Evidence
Overwhelmingly Confirms the Compelling Benefits of Racially Integrated Elementary
and Secondary Schools." BriefofProfs. Amy Stuart Wells et al., supra note 134, at *8.
143 Brief for Am. Educ. Research Ass'n, supra note 132, at *2.
144 See Linn & Welner, supra note 127.
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Louisville school districts did not satisfy strict scrutiny because they were not
narrowly tailored. 145 In reaching its conclusion, the opinion of the Court cites
no scientific research as constitutional fact. But further analyzing the
Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer opinions 146 for the use and non-use
of scientific evidence reveals not only depth of the ideological cleavages
among the Justices in Parents Involved but also offers insights into the
framing of their arguments and constitutional fact finding. Although only two
of the opinions cite scientific findings, there are three identifiable
frameworks in the Parents Involved cases: (1) a presumptive racial
balancing framework employed by both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Thomas that sees almost all race-conscious measures as categorically
unconstitutional, (2) a skeptical strict scrutiny framework employed by
Justice Kennedy that is highly exacting and wary of race-conscious
measures, and (3) a racial integration framework employed by Justice
Breyer that employs a more permissive cost-benefit approach to race-
conscious policies similar to Justice O'Connor's analysis in Grutter.
1. Roberts Plurality Opinion
The Court has confirmed in recent years that it will apply strict scrutiny
"to all racial classifications to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by
assuring that [government] is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant
use of a highly suspect tool."'1 47 The compelling interest analysis in Chief
Justice Roberts's plurality opinion that was not joined by Justice Kennedy is
notable for going beyond the basic "smoking out" inquiry and refraining the
school districts' racial diversity interest as a "racial balancing" interest. The
plurality opinion itself cites no scientific research studies, but does
145 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2746-54, 2759-61. The Court concluded that the
Seattle and Louisville policies were not necessary to achieve a goal of racial diversity and
that the districts had failed to adequately consider race-neutral alternatives. Id. at 2759-
61. Beyond the basic holding, however, the decision does not offer clear guidance on a
number of key issues. Justice Kennedy refused to join the plurality's compelling interest
analysis, and along with the four dissenting Justices formed a group of five Court
members recognizing compelling interests in preventing racial isolation and promoting
educational diversity; but there was no formal holding of the Court on the compelling
interest question. Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion outlines his views on
constitutionally acceptable programs, but it remains to be seen whether his opinion will
be adopted as controlling by the courts in future litigation. Id. (Kennedy, J. concurring)
146 1 do not include Justice Stevens' dissent in this discussion because of its brevity
and its focus on precedent and the proper interpretation of Brown v. Board of Education.
See id. at 2797-2800 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
147 Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 506 (2005) (quoting Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989)).
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acknowledge the dispute over the educational benefits of diversity. The
opinion states:
The parties and their amici dispute whether racial diversity in schools in
fact has a marked impact on test scores and other objective yardsticks or
achieves intangible socialization benefits. The debate is not one we need to
resolve, however, because it is clear that the racial classifications employed
by the districts are not narrowly tailored to the goal of achieving the
educational and social benefits asserted to flow from racial diversity. In
design and operation, the plans are directed only to racial balance, pure and
simple, an objective this Court has repeatedly condemned as illegitimate. 148
Chief Justice Roberts's argument rests on the assumption that the school
districts' interests were detached from educational goals and linked only to
demographic data and racial proportionality goals: "This working backward
to achieve a particular type of racial balance, rather than working forward
from some demonstration of the level of diversity that provides the purported
benefits, is a fatal flaw under our existing precedent."'1 49
In particular, the plurality opinion is critical of a weak point in the school
districts' empirical argument, a question that was not strongly documented
by the parties or by the amicus curiae briefs: What percentage or number of
minority students are necessary to achieve the benefits of diversity or to
avoid the harms of racial isolation? Although the plurality opinion notes trial
court-level expert testimony on having "sufficient numbers so as to avoid
students feeling any kind of specter of exceptionality" and the importance of
having "at least 20 percent" minority group representation in order to have
meaningful effects, the opinion ultimately rejects that evidence because of
the linkage to district demographic data.150 "The plans," according to the
plurality, were "tied to each district's specific racial demographics, rather
than to any pedagogic concept of the level of diversity needed to obtain the
asserted educational benefits."' 151
By employing a framework that recast the racial diversity interest as a
racial balancing interest, the plurality effectively isolated the Parents
Involved cases from their roots in desegregation law and from any science
that supported the school districts' interests. The plurality opinion severed
any meaningful connections between the Parents Involved cases and post-
Brown desegregation litigation by focusing on the distinction between
remedying intentional de jure segregation and addressing unintentional de
facto segregation; the plurality then divorced Parents Involved from Grutter
148 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2755.
149 Id. at 2757.
150 Id. at 2756.
151 Id. at 2755.
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by treating the higher education context as unique. 152 The Roberts plurality
could then eliminate the need for any empirical basis for showing the
benefits of diversity and the harms of racial isolation segregation. No amount
of scientific evidence would have been sufficient to negate the reframing of
the school districts' interests as racial balancing.
At the same time, the Roberts opinion asserts harms and costs resulting
from the use of race, but does not cite to any scientific literature to support
those assertions. In Part IV of his opinion, Chief Justice Roberts states that
racial classifications are inherently suspect because they contribute to an
escalation of racial hostility and conflict, and demean the dignity and worth
of a person to be judged by ancestry instead of by his or her own merit. The
Roberts plurality draws on both precedent and assumptions that are
ostensibly commonsensical to support these claims, yet psychological
research suggests that the picture is more complex.153 Research indicates that
the increased intergroup contact resulting from the use of racial
classifications tends to reduce prejudice and intergroup conflict rather than
increase it, and that while racial distinctions can lead to notions of inferiority,
minority group members can bear feelings of inferiority regardless of
whether racial classifications are sanctioned by the government. 154
2. Kennedy Concurring Opinion
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Parent Involved invokes a
highly skeptical strict scrutiny standard but nevertheless acknowledges the
school districts' compelling interests in avoiding racial isolation and
achieving a diverse student population. The Kennedy opinion cites no
scientific findings on the question of compelling interest, and is more directly
reliant on constitutional values and precedent than on constitutional facts. For
instance, in acknowledging that the legacy of Brown includes a legitimate
objective of equal opportunity, Justice Kennedy employed idealistic language
rooted in moral and constitutional values:
This Nation has a moral and ethical obligation to fulfill its historic
commitment to creating an integrated society that ensures equal opportunity
for all of its children. A compelling interest exists in avoiding racial
isolation, an interest that a school district, in its discretion and expertise,
152 Id. at 2751-54.
153 See Tropp, supra note 51, at 99-109 (comparing assertions of Parents Involved
opinions with recent scientific findings).
154 Id. at 101.
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may choose to pursue. Likewise, a district may consider it a compelling
interest to achieve a diverse student population.1 55
Moreover, unlike the Roberts plurality, Justice Kennedy's opinion
established a direct line between the Parents Involved cases and Grutter on
the question of compelling interest, and reformulated the school districts'
asserted interest in racial diversity as a broader, Grutter-like form of
educational diversity in which "[r]ace may be one component of that
diversity, but other demographic factors, plus special talents and needs,
should also be considered."' 156
As Justice Kennedy's opinion reveals, a scientific predicate was not
essential to establish that the school districts' interests were compelling,
although the cases on which Justice Kennedy relied as precedent did include
presentations and citations to scientific evidence. Justice Kennedy drew on
the long history of desegregation litigation to argue for the interest in
avoiding racial isolation: "Fifty years of experience since Brown v. Board of
Education, should teach us that the problem before us defies so easy a
solution. School districts can seek to reach Brown's objective of equal
educational opportunity."157 And his opinion turns directly to Grutter for
support of the diversity interest: "In the administration of public schools by
the state and local authorities it is permissible to consider the racial makeup
of schools and to adopt general policies to encourage a diverse student body,
one aspect of which is its racial composition."' 158
Justice Kennedy's opinion also omits any relevant findings on questions
of harm related to racial classifications, as well as on the effectiveness of
alternative policies that could satisfy constitutional standards. He cited no
empirical authority for the propositions that "[g]overnmental classifications
that command people to march in different directions based on racial
typologies can cause a new divisiveness" or that "[tlhe practice can lead to
corrosive discourse, where race serves not as an element of our diverse
heritage but instead as a bargaining chip in the political process."' 159 Nor did
his opinion cite research findings on the effectiveness of policies that he
believed could supplant explicit racial classifications, which included
strategic site selection of new schools, drawing attendance zones that
recognize the demographics of neighborhoods, allocating resources for
155 parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2755 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
156 Id
157 Id. at 2791 (citations omitted).
158 Id. at 2792.
15 9 Id. at 2797.
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special programs, targeted recruiting of students and faculty, and tracking
enrollments, performance, and other statistics by race.160
3. Breyer Dissenting Opinion
In contrast to the Roberts and Kennedy opinions, Justice Breyer's
dissenting opinion offers extensive citations to empirical findings and
includes appendices replete with tables, graphs, and multiple citations that
document recent trends in racial isolation and resegregation. The opinion
covers extensive ground in both law and constitutional fact, but two areas
merit special attention: (1) the opinion's framing of strict scrutiny as the
standard of review and (2) its use of scientific evidence to support Justice.
Breyer's strict scrutiny analysis and his assessment of the likely
consequences-of the Court's ruling.
Although the Breyer opinion ultimately casts its standard of review as
strict scrutiny, it is clear that Justice Breyer envisioned a contextual and more
deferential constitutional standard for the Parents Involved cases. Justice
Breyer's opinion first notes that adopting a more lenient standard than strict
scrutiny would not imply "abandonment of judicial efforts" to determine the
need for race-conscious criteria and the criteria's tailoring in light of the
need. 161 But his opinion then goes on to say that "in light of Grutter and
other precedents, I shall.., apply the version of strict scrutiny that those
cases embody."' 162 Nonetheless, Justice Breyer's version of strict scrutiny
still contains a degree of deference to the school districts. The opinion states,
for example, that "the evidence supporting an educational interest in racially
integrated schools is well established and strong enough to permit a
democratically elected school board reasonably to determine that this interest
is a compelling one." 163 But as Justice Thomas properly notes in his
concurring opinion, "[i]t is not up to the school boards-the very government
entities whose race-based practices we must strictly scrutinize-to determine
160 Id. For an analysis of the alternatives suggested by Justice Kennedy, as well as
other policy options for school districts, see Erica Frankenberg, Voluntary Integration
After Parents Involved: What Does Research Tell Us About Available Options? (Charles
Hamilton Houston Inst. for Race & Justice, Working Paper, Dec. 2007), available at
http://www.charleshamiltonhouston.org/Publications.aspx?year=2007.
161 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2819 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In the Ninth Circuit
en banc decision of Parents Involved, Judge Kozinski had urged in a concurring opinion
that a "robust and realistic rational basis review" was preferable to strict scrutiny because
the Seattle plan carried "none of the baggage the Supreme Court has found objectionable
in cases where it has applied strict scrutiny and narrow tailoring review." 426 F.3d 1162,
1194 (9th Cir. 2005) (Kozinski, J., concurring).
162 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2820 (citations omitted).
163 Id. at 2821.
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what interests qualify as compelling under the Fourteenth Amendment." 164 It
is ultimately the Court's prerogative to determine whether an interest is
sufficiently compelling, if strict scrutiny is indeed being applied. Justice
Breyer's version of strict scrutiny, whether it is relaxed or truly strict, is
nonetheless more permissive than Chief Justice Roberts's framework, and
invites the use of scientific evidence to demonstrate the benefits and harms
associated with the school districts' interests.
Justice Breyer's opinion confirms the view that an interest in promoting
or preserving greater racial integration within the public schools is
sufficiently compelling to justify the use of race-conscious measures.165 His
use of scientific evidence parallels his division of the school districts' racial
integration interests into three interrelated elements: (1) "a historical and
remedial element: an interest in setting right the consequences of prior
conditions of segregation"; 166 (2) "an educational element: an interest in
overcoming the adverse educational effects produced by and associated with
highly segregated schools"; 167 and (3) "a democratic element: an interest in
producing an educational environment that reflects the 'pluralistic society' in
which our children will live."'168
In addressing the historical/remedial element, Justice Breyer's opinion
and its Appendix A turn to recent studies of resegregation documenting
increasing levels racial isolation from the 1970s through the current
decade. 169 These studies show that racial isolation has increased steadily
from previous decades and in many areas is approaching levels that existed
in the 1950s. In addressing the educational element, his opinion notes
multiple studies which suggest that "children taken from [segregated] schools
and placed in integrated settings often show positive academic gains"'170 and
that "(1) black students' educational achievement is improved in integrated
schools as compared to racially isolated schools, (2) black students'
educational achievement is improved in integrated classes, and (3) the earlier
that black students are removed from racial isolation, the better their
educational outcomes." 71
In addressing the democratic elements of the integration interest, the
Breyer opinion cites several studies and identifies a number of findings:
"black and white students in desegregated schools are less racially prejudiced
164 Id. at 2778 (Thomas, J., concurring).
165 Id. at 2820 (Breyer, J., concurring).
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2821.
169 Id. at 2838-39 (Appendix A).
170 Id. at 2820.
171Id. at 2821.
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than those in segregated schools"; "interracial contact in desegregated
schools leads to an increase in interracial sociability and friendship"; "both
black and white students who attend integrated schools are more likely to
work in desegregated companies after graduation than students who attended
racially isolated schools"; "desegregation of schools can help bring adult
communities together by reducing segregated housing"; and "[c]ities that
have implemented successful school desegregation plans have witnessed
increased interracial contact and neighborhoods that tend to become less
racially segregated."172
Justice Breyer's opinion also cites scientific research to support various
elements of his narrow tailoring analysis. He notes, for instance, that there is
research-based evidence supporting the use of target ratios tied to a district's
underlying population, and that a "ratio no greater than 50% minority.., is
helpful in limiting the risk of 'white flight.""' 173 Moreover, although he does
not cite specific studies to support his point, Justice Breyer states that after
"[h]aving looked at dozens of amicus briefs, public reports, news stories, and
the records in many of this Court's prior cases," he could find "no example
or model that would permit this Court to say to Seattle and to Louisville:
'Here is an instance of a desegregation plan that is likely to achieve your
objectives and also makes less use of race-conscious criteria than your
plans.' 174
In addition, Part V of the Breyer opinion-entitled "Consequences"--
goes beyond the strict scrutiny analysis to assess the likely consequences of
the Court's decision to strike down the Seattle and Louisville policies. 175 In
this section as well, Justice Breyer employs constitutional facts and research
studies to argue that the ruling would require setting aside the laws of several
states and local communities. 176 The "Consequences" section quotes
extensively from a U.S. Civil Rights Commission study assessing a wide
range of desegregation strategies throughout the country, as well as statistics
from a study examining the use of "open choice" plans in several states. 177
Referring again to Appendix A of his opinion, Justice Breyer notes the
172 1d. at 2822.
173 Id. at 2827.
174 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2827 (emphasis in original).
175 Justice Breyer's attention to consequences is not specific to the voluntary
desegregation context. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 115-32 (2005) (discussing
importance of examining consequences of court rulings as an element of constitutional
interpretation).
176 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2833.
177 Id. at 2831-32.
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serious educational, social, and civil problems associated with resegregation
that are likely to result from the Court's ruling. 178
One rule that Justice Breyer did not attempt to articulate, however, is a
specific evidentiary standard-either for the volume and strength of the
scientific literature or for the level of agreement among researchers-needed
to satisfy the compelling interest test. In a number of sections, his opinion
indicates that there are some scientific research studies which reach
conclusions contrary to the studies that he cites, but he ultimately concludes
that the evidence supporting his position is either "well established" or
"firmly established" and that it is either "strong enough" or "sufficiently
strong" to make the integration interest compelling.1 79 His opinion also
makes the point that "[i]f we are to insist upon unanimity in the social
science literature before finding a compelling interest, we might never find
one."' 180 These phrases alone suggest that a standard, if adopted, would likely
require substantiality but not unanimity within a body of relevant literature.
4. Thomas Concurring Opinion
Justice Thomas's concurring opinion also contains extensive citations to
scientific literature, but his opinion is designed primarily to rebut the
arguments of Justice Breyer, so his analyses of the science do not represent
an attempt to engage in a thorough balancing test or to evaluate the evidence
against a legal standard that determines whether a scientific predicate
sufficiently supports a compelling interest. Indeed, Justice Thomas, who was
also a member of the Roberts plurality in Parents Involved, states
unequivocally in the conclusion of his opinion that he has no tolerance for
race-conscious measures: "The plans before us base school assignment
decisions on students' race. Because '[o]ur Constitution is color-blind, and
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens,' such race-based
decisionmaking is unconstitutional."' 181 Thus, his treatment of scientific
evidence is highly skeptical, and he chastises Justice Breyer for adopting an
approach that would leave equal protection jurisprudence "at the mercy of
178 Id. at 2833.
179 Id. at 2821, 2824.
180 Id. at 2824. Justice Breyer also offered a counterargument to Justice Thomas's
citation of the work of David Armor: "[Justice Thomas] is entitled of course to his own
opinion as to which studies he finds convincing-although it bears mention that even the
author of some of Justice Thomas' preferred studies has found some evidence linking
integrated learning environments to increased academic achievement." Id. (citations
omitted; emphasis in original).
181 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2788 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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elected government officials evaluating the evanescent views of a handful of
social scientists." 182
Justice Thomas focuses his discussion of the scientific research on its
contestability and begins his analysis of the science by criticizing the dissent
for "unquestioningly accepting the assertions of selected social scientists
while completely ignoring the fact that those assertions are the subject of
fervent debate."' 183 The studies cited by Justice Thomas are placed largely in
opposition to each other to show the inconclusiveness of the literature:
"Scholars have differing opinions as to whether educational benefits arise
from racial balancing. Some have concluded that black students receive
genuine educational benefits.... Others have been more
circumspect.... And some have concluded that there are no demonstrable
educational benefits."'1 84 In addition, Justice Thomas noted that the Parents
Involved amicus curiae briefs mirrored the divergence of scientific opinion,
and criticized the amicus briefs supporting the school districts for not
providing "specific details like the magnitude of the claimed positive effects
or the precise demographic mix at which those positive effects begin to be
realized."185 Justice Thomas further cited research highlighting the success of
black students in racially isolated environments 186 and consequently asserted
that it was far from apparent that "coerced racial mixing has any educational
benefits [and] that integration is necessary to black achievement."' 87
Later addressing the democratic element of Justice Breyer's integration
interest, an element that Justice Thomas considered "limitless in scope,"'1 88
the Thomas opinion rejected the claim that increased interracial contact leads
to improved racial attitudes and relations. First, Justice Thomas challenged
the notion that more racially balanced schools necessarily result in increased
contact between white and black students: "Simply putting students together
under the same roof does not necessarily mean that the students will learn
together or even interact. 1189 In support of this assertion, his opinion cites
studies showing that students are often tracked into classes by ability, which
182 Id. at 2778.
183 Id. at 2773.
184 Id. at 2776 (citations omitted).
185 Id. Justice Thomas juxtaposed the amicus briefs of the American Educational
Research Association and the 553 Social Scientists with the amicus briefs of Murphy et
al. and Armor et al.
186 Justice Thomas did not, however, indicate whether the studies focusing on black
achievement reflected typical achievement levels or whether the particular nature of the
program-special curriculum or enrichment attached to the school setting-was more
influential on student achievement.
187 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2776.




results in racial segregation within a school. Second, Justice Thomas argued
that the research literature provided no clear support for Justice Breyer's
position, at least within the universe of studies that Justice Thomas cited,
which were primarily from the 1970s and 1980s. The studies, he concluded,
were largely equivocal, with some studies even finding "that a deterioration
in racial attitudes seems to result from racial mixing in schools."'190 Thus no
democratic element could support an integration interest because of the
paucity of evidence supporting Justice Breyer's position. 191
Although Justice Thomas's assessment of the literature is undoubtedly
accurate in finding a lack of unanimity, his opinion makes no attempt to
assess the volume of studies, the number of researchers supporting a position,
the timing of the studies, or the levels of agreement and disagreement among
the researchers. Thus, one study identifying educational benefits is weighed
against another study showing no educational benefits, and one or two
amicus briefs supporting the school districts are weighed equally against one
or two amicus briefs supporting the plaintiff. While an assessment of the
literature should not treat the research as a popularity contest, Justice
Thomas's opinion contains no attempt to determine if a brief representing the
view of over 500 researchers might carry more persuasive weight than a brief
representing the view of three researchers. Nor does he assess whether more
recent studies that supersede the findings of earlier studies should be
considered more persuasive. 192 Indeed, Justice Thomas could easily be
accused of adopting a cherry-picking strategy in selecting evidence, but
given his framing of the compelling interest inquiry and his goal of
undermining Justice Breyer's empirical arguments, his assessment of the
research is unsurprising. And since his opinion does not articulate any
standard under which the compelling interest inquiry could actually be met,
Justice Thomas's analysis could readily conclude that the requirement was
not satisfied.193
5. Summary
The multiple opinions in Parents Involved illuminate longstanding
ideological differences within the Supreme Court--differences that have
190Id. at 2781.
191 Id.
192 See Mickelson, supra note 14, at 1188 (comparing citation of older research by
amicus briefs and the Court in Parents Involved with citation of more recent research and
methodologies).
193 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2782. Justice Thomas's concluding language is
strongly rhetorical: "Stripped of the baseless and novel interests the dissent asserts on
their behalf, the school boards cannot plausibly maintain that their plans further a
compelling interest." Id.
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become even more acute with the latest composition of the Court and the
alignment of the Justices. The constitutional frameworks adopted by the
Justices in Parents Involved reflect these ideological differences, and the
frameworks ultimately guided how the Justices sought constitutional facts
and relevant scientific evidence. The Roberts plurality saw little need for
constitutional fact finding once the school districts' interests in promoting
diversity and addressing racial isolation had been transmuted into mere racial
balancing interests. Justice Kennedy, relying on legal principles and
precedent, did not turn to any constitutional fact finding either, although he
reached a different conclusion on the compelling interest inquiries. Neither
Justice Breyer nor Justice Thomas, the only Justices who cited scientific
literature, provided doctrinal guidance on the appropriate uses of scientific
evidence as constitutional facts, nor did they provide a standard to which a
quantum of scientific evidence could be pegged in order to satisfy the
compelling interest inquiry. Both of their analyses were grounded in their
particular framing of strict scrutiny.
Problems related to the objectivity and selective use of scientific
evidence clearly arose in Parents Involved, with competing expert witnesses,
the submission of diametrically opposed sets of amicus curiae briefs, and
markedly different analyses of research literature in the Thomas and Breyer
opinions. Many of these problems may be intractable given the nature of the
adversarial process and the constitutional frameworks of the Justices, but at
least some of them can be traced to the lack of clear standards in fact finding
and equal protection standards of review. As I propose in the next Part, there
should still be room for reform in the area of constitutional fact finding and
the use of scientific evidence, even if the entrenched frameworks of the
Justices limit progress in the area of race-conscious policy making.
V. REFRAMING EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
As Parents Involved and other recent equal protection cases show,
constitutional fact finding and the citation of scientific evidence are closely
tethered to frameworks of constitutional interpretation. Values and
ideological perspectives strongly shape these frameworks and delimit factual
inquiries. Clearer and more consistent approaches to constitutional fact
finding and the use of science could improve the courts' analyses, and there
have been a wide range of recommendations for reform, including calls to
develop unitary theories of constitutional fact finding; 194 to establish
principles of constraint, such as remanding cases to the lower courts for
additional fact finding or ordering reargument in appropriate
194See DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS 159-81 (2008).
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circumstances; 195 or to increase judicial capacity to gather scientific evidence
through the appointment of experts or special masters196 or through the
creation of separate, specialized research services.197 Yet, the federal courts
have been highly resistant to change, and significant improvements seem
unlikely given the unsuccessful history of many proposals. Indeed, the most
basic of procedural steps-requiring the parties at trial to introduce both
adjudicative and constitutional facts to produce as complete a record as
possible--can be illusory; the appellate courts will still likely seek to go
beyond the record for their own constitutional fact finding.
Rather than dwell on already well-tread recommendations to develop a
coherent fact-finding theory or to expand the courts' capacity to address
scientific evidence, I propose that shifts in the basic frameworks and
substantive approaches to equal protection problems can lead to
improvements in the usage of scientific evidence. My recommendations
focus on articulating informational roles for scientific evidence in heightened
scrutiny, and refocusing key questions in the compelling interest inquiries
and the narrow tailoring inquiries. I resist suggesting, however, that the
courts adopt a uniform standard for evaluating scientific evidence in
isolation, and instead propose that the evaluation be linked to the nature of
the legal inquiry and the total body of relevant evidence, including both
scientific and non-scientific information.
A. Future Litigation: Classifications and Standards of Review
Key areas of equal protection analysis--determining the nature of a
classification, determining a classification's applicable standard of review,
and determining if a policy satisfies the standard of review-are all likely in
the future to benefit from the empirical insights of relevant scientific
evidence. The Supreme Court only occasionally addresses questions of
whether a particular classification should be recognized or whether a
particular classification should be subject to heightened scrutiny, but
scientific evidence could still play a role in addressing either of these
questions. For example, recent developments in genetic science have led to
concerns about discrimination by employers and insurers on the basis of
genetic predispositions to illness. Statutes such as the federal Genetic
195 Kenneth L. Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SuP. CT.
REV. 75, 95 (1960).
196 Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science:
Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV. 91, 158-60 (1993).
197Id. at 160; Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative
Lawmaking: A Proposed Research Service for the Supreme Court, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1,
15 (1986).
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Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 have been enacted to address
potential problems.' 98 New governmental classifications linked to genetic
information-as well as to the intersection of genetics with race and
gender-may develop over time, and constitutional law will likely need to
turn to the latest scientific developments if problems of differential treatment
arise. Inquiries may focus on whether a classification is actually a new one
deserving special analysis, whether a genetic classification tied to particular
racial groups or to one gender or another constitutes unconstitutional
discrimination, 199  and whether classifications based on genetic
predispositions merit heightened scrutiny.
Given recent trends in state equal protection law and ongoing
controversies over same-sex marriage, 200 the federal courts may also be
198 Pub. L. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., 29
U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). Among Congress's key findings in developing the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 were the following:
Deciphering the sequence of the human genome and other advances in genetics open
major new opportunities for medical progress. New knowledge about the genetic
basis of illness will allow for earlier detection of illnesses, often before symptoms
have begun. Genetic testing can allow individuals to take steps to reduce the
likelihood that they will contract a particular disorder. New knowledge about
genetics may allow for the development of better therapies that are more effective
against disease or have fewer side effects than current treatments. These advances
give rise to the potential misuse of genetic information to discriminate in health
insurance and employment....
[T]he current explosion in the science of genetics, and the history of sterilization
laws by the States based on early genetic science, compels Congressional action in
this area
Congress clearly has a compelling public interest in relieving the fear of
discrimination and in prohibiting its actual practice in employment and health
insurance.
Id. at 881-82.
199 Because of the intent requirement in equal protection jurisprudence, disparate
impact alone is insufficient to prove intentional discrimination based on race or gender.
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256 (1979). Additional evidence beyond a statistical correlation between a genetic
predisposition on the one hand and race or gender on the other would be necessary to
prove intentional discrimination on the basis of race or gender.
20
°See Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008)
(Connecticut Supreme Court ruling that sexual orientation is a quasi-suspect
classification and denial of marriage license to same-sex couples violates equal protection
under intermediate scrutiny); In Re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (California
Supreme Court ruling that sexual orientation is a suspect classification and denial of
marriage license to same-sex couples violates equal protection under strict scrutiny);
Goodridge v. Dep't of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (Massachusetts
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addressing whether classifications based on sexual orientation deserve
heightened review. In Romer v. Evans,20 1 the Supreme Court applied a
rational basis test in striking down a state constitutional provision that
infringed on the rights of lesbians and gay men to access the political
process, but did not address the question of whether sexual orientation is a
suspect or semi-suspect classification. Questions such as whether sexual
orientation is an immutable characteristic, whether there are historical and
ongoing harms resulting from discrimination against lesbians, gay men, and
bisexuals, and whether there are harms associated with same-sex marriage
could be informed by relevant medical, psychological, and sociological
findings-and would no doubt be offered by advocates on both sides of the
issue.202
But the most contested issues of equal protection law are likely to
revolve around questions of strict scrutiny and race. With the Grutter Court's
opening the door to compelling interests other than the remediation of past
discrimination, including forward-looking interests like promoting
educational diversity in higher education, the federal courts will no doubt be
called upon to assess whether a number of different race-conscious policies
satisfy strict scrutiny. Indeed, because the Parents Involved Court itself did
not provide a clear holding on whether promoting racial diversity and
avoiding racial isolation in K-12 education are compelling interests, the
question may still be subject to litigation. And there are a number of
questions that the Supreme Court has not directly addressed, including the
constitutionality of minority-only programs for K-12 and higher education
students,20 3 race-conscious policies designed to advance faculty diversity,204
Supreme Judicial Court ruling that denial of marriage license to same-sex couples
violates equal protection under rational basis test).
201 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
202 Scientific evidence has been introduced in a number of previous Supreme Court
cases involving sexual orientation, and members of the Court have cited findings from
professional associations such as the American Psychological Association, the American
Psychiatric Association, and the American Public Health Association in addressing
questions of sexual orientation and mental health. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530
U.S. 640, 699-700 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
203 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
203 See Peter Schmidt, Dow Jones Fund Opens Journalism Programs to White
Students After Lawsuit, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 23, 2007, at A18 (discussing
lawsuit challenging minority-only summer program for aspiring journalism students);
Andrija Samardzich, Note, Protecting Race-Exclusive Scholarships from Extinction With
an Alternative Compelling State Interest, 81 IND. L.J. 1121 (2006) (discussing
constitutionality of minority-only scholarships).
204 See generally L. Damell Weeden, Back to the Future: Should Grutter's Diversity
Rationale Apply to Faculty Hiring? Is Title VII Implicated? 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 511 (2005); Jonathan Alger, When Color-Blind is Color-Bland: Ensuring Faculty
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and race-conscious employment policies to meet the operational needs of law
enforcement and other public agencies. 205
Moreover, a number of empirical questions that arose in Parents
Involved were not thoroughly addressed by the Court or by advocates, and
could arise in future cases addressing the narrow tailoring of race-conscious
policies. For instance, the "critical mass" question of what might constitute a.
minimal or optimal percentage of minority students in a particular setting
was a concern in the Roberts plurality opinion and the Thomas concurring
opinion in Parents Involved, but neither the parties nor the amicus briefs
supporting the school districts provided as much empirical support for this
question as they did for the compelling interest question.20 6 Another issue in
Parents Involved focused on the use of race-neutral alternatives, which
formed one basis for the Court's ruling against the school districts and was
also highlighted in Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion; the relative
effectiveness of race-neutral alternatives is likely to become a key inquiry in
upcoming cases.
B. Strict Scrutiny Frameworks and Evidentiary Standard
Neither the Thomas concurrence nor the Breyer dissent in Parents
Involved offered clear guidelines for determining the factual predicate to
conclude that the school districts had satisfied strict scrutiny. Justice
Thomas's insistence on virtual unanimity in the scientific literature is
unrealistic and unworkable, and Justice Breyer's opinion only hints at a
possible standard. The Roberts plurality assumed away any empirical
questions by recasting the districts' interests as racial balancing, and Justice
Kennedy's opinion found no need to cite scientific findings to conclude that
the school districts' interests were sufficiently compelling, relying instead on
Diversity in Higher Education, 10 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 191 (1999). In University and
Community College System of Nevada v. Farmer, the Nevada Supreme Court upheld a
race-conscious faculty hiring plan under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, ruling that
"race must be only one of several factors used in evaluating applicants" and "the
desirability of a racially diverse faculty [is] sufficiently analogous to the constitutionally
permissible attainment of a racially diverse student body. .. ." 930 P.2d 730, 735 (Nev.
1997). The Farmer Court did not directly address faculty diversity under constitutional
standards, but noted the relationship between student body diversity and faculty diversity.
205 See Lomack v. City of Newark, 463 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 2006) (rejecting
compelling interest in promoting racial diversity among fire fighters); Cotter v. City of
Boston, 323 F.3d 160, 172 n.10 (1st Cir. 2003) (declining to address question of
compelling interest but expressing sympathy for "the argument that communities place
more trust in a diverse police force and that the resulting trust reduces crime rates and
improves policing.").
206 See Linn & Welner, supra note 127, at 33-35 (analyzing limited discussion of
critical mass question in Parents Involved amicus curiae briefs).
1164 [Vol. 69:1115
CONSTITUTIONAL FACT FINDING
values, history, and precedent. Indeed, the Kennedy opinion raises the
question of whether scientific evidence is even needed at all to answer the
compelling interest inquiry. Looking ahead to future litigation, there may be
two potential areas in equal protection doctrine that can shift the overall
frameworks and the information gathering of the courts: (1) the reframing of
strict scrutiny as a cost-benefit analysis and (2) the development of
evidentiary standards in non-remedial strict scrutiny cases.
1. Reframing Strict Scrutiny: Cost-Benefit Analyses
Strict scrutiny, as the Court has reiterated in its recent cases, has
traditionally been designed to "smoke out" illegitimate uses of race, so that a
racial classification is not motivated by "illegitimate notions of racial
inferiority or simple racial politics." 20 7 The Roberts plurality in Parents
Involved, for example, saw little need for constitutional fact finding and
summarily concluded that the school districts' objective was "racial balance,
pure and simple," and thus constitutionally impermissible. 20 8 But smoking
out true motives has not been the sole function of strict scrutiny in recent
cases. As Justice O'Connor noted in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pehia,
strict scrutiny also embodies a balancing of costs and benefits:
[W]henever the government treats any person unequally because of his or
her race, that person has suffered an injury that falls squarely within the
language and spirit of the Constitution's guarantee of equal
protection.... The application of strict scrutiny, in turn, determines
whether a compelling governmental interest justifies the infliction of that
injury. 209
Justice O'Connor's contextual analysis in Grutter and Justice Breyer's
dissent in Parents Involved represent clear turns toward cost-benefit
balancing, where overall educational and social benefits were evaluated
against burdens and harms to individuals who might be adversely affected by
race-conscious policies. In Grutter, Justice O'Connor weighed the
educational benefits of diversity, which were "substantial" and "not
207 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality
opinion).
208 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2755.
209 515 U.S. 200, 229-30 (1995). See generally Adams, supra note 110, at 1943
(discussing recent trends of cost-benefit balancing in equal protection cases); Kim Forde-
Mazrui, The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action, 88 GEO. L.J.
2331, 2359-64 (2000) (same); Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427,
436-44 (1997) (same).
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theoretical but real," 210 against the fact that an individualized race-conscious
admissions policy "does not unduly harm nonminority applicants." 211
Similarly, Justice Breyer's dissent in Parents Involved concluded that
eradicating the "remnants... of primary and secondary school segregation,"
creating "school environments that provide better educational opportunities
for all children," and creating "citizens better prepared to know, to
understand, and to work with people of all races and backgrounds," 212 far
outweighed the costs of using racial criteria that affected "potentially
disadvantaged students less severely, not more severely, than the criteria at
issue in Grutter."213
Examining strict scrutiny through a cost-benefit frame highlights
multiple inquiries under the Court's existing compelling interest/narrow
tailoring inquiries. The compelling interest inquiry must focus on both the
importance of a policy and its motivation; adjudicative facts are critical to
assess sincerity in motives, but constitutional facts are central to the policy
determination that a law is sufficiently important to be compelling. Whether
an interest is important is, of course, not a purely empirical inquiry; it is
intertwined with value judgments that reflect moral and constitutional norms.
Indeed, some interests may be so strongly valued-for example,
governmental interests in protecting national security or in remedying past
racial segregation under law-that they are unlikely to be challenged as
insufficiently important, even if the government's true motives may be
invidious or the challenged policy does not satisfy narrow tailoring. But
constitutional facts rooted in empirical inquiries can clearly inform those
value judgments when the assessment involves other types of social benefits.
The Grutter Court's analysis, for example, makes clear that empirical
evidence of the concrete educational benefits that accrue to a wide range of
students, not merely underrepresented minorities, underscore the importance
of diversity as a governmental interest that can justify race-conscious policy
making.
Elements of narrow tailoring can also turn to constitutional facts in cost-
benefit versions of strict scrutiny.214 The Grutter Court confirmed that
inquiries into three areas were central to a narrow tailoring analysis of
university admissions programs: (1) the necessity of particular race-
conscious policies, (2) the burdens on non-minority applicants, and (3) the
210 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
211 Id. at 341.
212 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2823.
213 Id. at 2825 (emphasis omitted).
214 For an evaluation of cost-benefit approaches to narrow tailoring in university
admissions, see Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don't Tell, Don't Ask: Narrow Tailoring
After Grutter and Gratz, 85 TEx. L. REv. 517 (2007).
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viability of workable race-neutral alternatives. An inquiry into the necessity
of a particular policy addresses the specific benefits of that policy and its
relative strength compared to other policies (or to no policy at all); an inquiry
into undue burdens addresses the costs to third-parties who may be injured
by a policy; and an inquiry into race-neutral alternatives compares the costs
and benefits of a challenged policy against the costs and benefits of policies
that do not employ race. All of these inquiries are highly relevant in future
challenges to race-conscious policies and could rely on empirical research
that assesses the benefits and costs of various policies.
The Supreme Court has not yet developed an explicit cost-benefit
framework to complement its compelling interest and narrow tailoring
inquiries under strict scrutiny. Nor is it entirely clear under Grutter how
much the benefits must outweigh the costs in order to satisfy strict scrutiny,
although there is no question that the benefits must be significant and costs
quite small in order to justify a race-conscious policy. And there can be a
danger, as Jed Rubenfeld has cautioned, that strict scrutiny can become "an
escape hatch through which government can, with impunity, violate equal
protection principles in the name of more important state interests." 215 Yet,
as the Court moves forward in addressing a variety of asserted governmental
interests and race-conscious policies, the weighing of societal benefits
against the costs to affected individuals seems inevitable. Any shift to cost-
benefit analysis clearly implies that constitutional facts, including scientific
evidence, will be crucial in strict scrutiny inquiries because of the need to
establish the value of social costs and benefits, as well as to assess the
balance between the two.
2. Evidentiary Standards: Strong Basis in Evidence
Developing workable evidentiary standards under either a cost-benefit
framework or the traditional smoking-out framework of strict scrutiny
presents another set of challenges. First, equal protection doctrine is subject
to more variability after Grutter because of the Court's determination that
there can be contextual differences in strict scrutiny. 216 Even though the
Roberts plurality in Parents Involved did not extend the same degree of
deference to the K-12 educational setting that Justice O'Connor extended in
Grutter's higher education setting, context could still matter in future cases.
A more relaxed form of strict scrutiny might not necessitate a strong
evidentiary requirement because of the good-faith deference afforded to an
institution, but, assuming that the courts continue to apply versions of strict
215 Rubenfeld, supra note 208, at 440.
2 16 See Angelo N. Ancheta, Contextual Strict Scrutiny and Race-Conscious Policy
Making, 36 LOY. U. CHi. L.J. 21 (2004).
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scrutiny that are more exacting and searching, a basic evidentiary
requirement would be consistent with the underlying goals of the compelling
interest and narrow tailoring inquiries. 217 Second, an evidentiary standard
must be workable and realistically attainable so that the strict scrutiny
standard does not become "fatal in fact." Justice Thomas's framework in
Parents Involved, for instance, is so doctrinaire and inflexible that nothing
short of unanimity in the scientific evidence could possibly satisfy the
compelling interest requirement. Establishing an explicit evidentiary
requirement should build on standards that are both attainable and
sufficiently rigorous to make the strict scrutiny inquiry a meaningful one.
The Supreme Court already requires factual predicates for strict scrutiny
in one line of equal protection cases. In cases involving the remediation of
past racial discrimination, the Court has insisted on adjudicative fact finding
and established a "strong basis in evidence" requirement to ensure that a
government's remedial interest is justified by a past history of significant and
particularized discrimination. 218 The interest in remedying discrimination is,
in the abstract, a compelling interest because of the importance of redressing
past legal harms, but the courts apply the strong basis in evidence rule and
evaluate statistical analyses and other evidence of specific discrimination by
an institution in order to smoke out and ensure that remediation reflects the
government's true motivating interest. While the Court has not established an
evidentiary rule for strict scrutiny outside the remedial context, adapting
workable rules in appropriate non-remedial settings could ensure that race-
conscious policies are motivated by important policy goals, rather than racial
politics, and that the courts engage in accurate cost-benefit calculations.
There is no guarantee that judges who are predisposed to characterize nearly
all uses of race as "racial balancing" will find a body of evidence to be
sufficient, but applying an evidentiary standard would at least establish a
process by which courts would carefully evaluate the evidence and not make
mechanical or automatic decisions about a policy's constitutionality.
Employing a requirement for a strong basis in evidence in non-remedial
(and non-deferential) strict scrutiny analyses would mandate that a
significant quantum of evidence be introduced by the government, and would
also require trial courts, at least in cases of first impression where the
constitutional law questions remain unsettled, to engage in extensive fact
217 The intermediate scrutiny standard represents a ratcheted-down version of strict
scrutiny, but is still searching and exacting. By implication, an evidentiary standard for
strict scrutiny could serve as an initial benchmark for intermediate-level analyses, but
presumably the standard would be more relaxed in intermediate scrutiny cases.
218 See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909-10 (1996); Croson, 488 U.S. at 500.
See generally Nicki Herbert, Comment, Appellate Review of "A Strong Basis in
Evidence" in Public Contracting Cases, 77 U. COLO. L. REv. 193 (2006).
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finding for both adjudicative and constitutional facts. 219 The government
would bear the initial burden of producing substantial evidence of the
benefits of their policy along with evidence designed to satisfy various
elements of narrow tailoring. The types of evidence will no doubt vary from
case to case, but evidence of a policy's need-both absolute and relative to
other policies-its value, the consequences of adopting the policy, and its
burdens and costs are likely to be essential in most cases. Plaintiffs
challenging a policy should then bear the burden of producing significant
evidence that rebuts the government's evidence.220 Shifting constitutional
fact finding to the trial court level would place additional burdens on the
parties to introduce evidence at trial (and to turn to amici curiae earlier in the
litigation), but it would not be unreasonable since "legislators, not judges,
have primary responsibility for drawing policy conclusions from empirical
fact"221 and government should be marshalling evidence of the benefits and
costs of race-conscious policies well in advance of potential litigation.
The filtering and gatekeeping functions of the trial court would be
available to regulate all types of evidence, even if the trial court chose to
apply more open-ended analyses to constitutional facts. Constitutional facts,
including relevant scientific information, would be used to inform the value
judgment about a governmental interest's importance and its social benefits
and costs. Adjudicative facts for a particular program would also be part of
the calculus and would be useful in determining the sincerity of the
governmental objective and smoking out any illicit motives. A formal
evidentiary standard would thus move the primary basis for constitutional
and adjudicative facts to the creation of a trial record rather than placing a
heavy reliance on amicus briefs and other sources of constitutional fact in the
appellate courts.
219 In the context of higher education admissions, Goodwin Liu has outlined an
evidentiary standard for addressing both the importance of a compelling interest and the
sincerity of governmental motives. Goodwin Liu, Affirmative Action in Higher
Education: The Diversity Rationale and the Compelling Interest Test, 33 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 381, 401-10 (1998). Although his analysis predates the Grutter decision,
Liu suggests that a strong basis in evidence requirement in a non-remedial setting would
ensure that courts are able to make informed judgments about the importance of race-
conscious policies and are able to smoke out true governmental motives.
220 A common expression of the plaintiffs' burden in remedial settings is the
following: "After the government's initial showing, the burden shifts to [the plaintiff] to
rebut that showing: 'Notwithstanding the burden of initial production that rests' with the
government, '[t]he ultimate burden [of proof] remains with [the challenging party] to
demonstrate the unconstitutionality of an affirmative-action program."' Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147, 1166 (10th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
221 Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2860 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(discussing role of legislature and courts in addressing policy conclusions drawn from a
wide range of empirical studies).
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However, in proposing that the lion's share of fact finding shift to the
trial courts, I do not suggest that constitutional fact finding by appellate
courts should be restricted in any significant way. The appellate courts,
including the Supreme Court, should not mechanically defer to trial court
findings of constitutional fact and should still have the ability to go beyond
the record on questions of law. But I do propose that the trial court play a
more important precursory role as the gatekeeper and initial evaluator of
constitutional facts under a requirement that strict scrutiny be satisfied
through a strong basis in evidence.
Nor am I proposing a science-specific evidentiary standard for either the
compelling interest requirement or the narrow tailoring requirement under
strict scrutiny. Instead, I am offering a more general fact finding standard
that would include relevant scientific and non-scientific evidence. At this
level, the proposal may elide some of the difficult questions that arise with
the use of scientific evidence, but making the compelling interest and narrow
tailoring inquiries contingent upon a scientific predicate would be both
unwise and overly circumscribed. As I discussed in Part II of this Essay,
basing a constitutional ruling entirely or largely on scientific evidence can
leave a decision on unstable ground. Moreover, there is no guarantee that
scientific evidence will be available on a particular legal question given, as
one court of appeals has noted, "the leisurely pace at which most academic
research proceeds." 222 Indeed, "[i]f academic research is required to validate
any departure from strict racial neutrality, social experimentation in the area
of race will be impossible despite its urgency. '223 This is not to say that
scientific findings cannot be highly informative or cannot significantly tip the
balance in a compelling interest or narrow tailoring inquiry. In educational
rights cases like Grutter and Parents Involved, the body of scientific research
may be highly developed. But a general rule for strict scrutiny should look at
the totality of evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to substantiate a
government's defense of a race-conscious policy.
Determining whether there is a significant body of scientific research that
addresses a strict scrutiny inquiry would thus be a threshold question for a
court engaging in constitutional fact finding. If the research literature is
insubstantial or clearly inconclusive, the court might still turn to other
sources, including witness testimony, historical sources, and anecdotal
sources, with an understanding that the absence of scientific information,
while not fatal, could weaken the defense of a race-conscious policy. If there
is a significant body of scientific evidence relevant to constitutional fact
finding, a trial court could employ traditional screening mechanisms for





expert testimony, such as examining whether a scientific theory has been
tested and is falsifiable, examining whether it has been subjected to peer
review and publication, assessing the standards employed for a specific
scientific theory and its error rate, and assessing the theory's general
acceptance within a scientific community. 224 The appellate courts are not
able to engage in cross-examination and other assessments of witness
credibility, but they could still engage sua sponte in comparable gatekeeping
of the information contained in amicus briefs and other sources.225
Because of the Justices' strongly ideological frameworks in cases
involving race and other controversial subjects, it seems unlikely that a
requirement for a strong basis in evidence would have changed the basic
votes in cases like Grutter or Parents Involved. In Grutter, the University of
Michigan offered extensive evidence at trial that likely would have satisfied a
strong basis in evidence requirement, even if the Supreme Court had not
adopted a more deferential strict scrutiny framework. However, an
evidentiary requirement might have changed the litigation posture of the
Grutter plaintiffs, who might have introduced oppositional evidence or
conducted more cross-examination at trial. The Grutter Court ultimately
relied on a variety of sources to reach its compelling interest conclusion,
including both scientific and non-scientific evidence, but might have engaged
in a more thorough analysis of the educational benefits literature and might
have examined additional scientific evidence that bore on the cost elements
of narrow tailoring, including undue burdens and race-neutral alternatives.
In Parents Involved, the defendant school districts also offered a
significant quantum of evidence at trial, and the trial courts engaged in a
careful analysis of the science. But in the Supreme Court, the Roberts
plurality was disinclined to look beyond the barest of adjudicative facts.
Given the ideological grounding of their framework, if the Roberts plurality
had engaged in a cost-benefit analysis it might still have reached the same
conclusions; however, the opinion would have reflected an extra level of
224 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-95 (1993);
FED. R. EviD. 702.
225 A court might also have to determine, if there was some disagreement in the
literature, whether the literature as a whole was sufficient to support a challenged policy.
In contrast to Justice Thomas's approach in Parents Involved, a court employing a more
realistic standard should take into account the fact that no field of inquiry will have
unanimity within its literature. An evidentiary standard drawing on general acceptance,
which is an existing element of gatekeeping under the federal rules of evidence, or a
specific standard such as a "strong majority" implied by Justice Breyer in Parents
Involved would be superior to Justice Thomas's unworkable unanimity standard. A trial
court could rely on an expert witness or a special master to make such a determination,
while an appellate court could make its own determination through an evaluation of the
available evidence.
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analysis that would have better illuminated" their core value judgments.
Justice Thomas also might have reached an identical legal conclusion in
Parents Involved, but his analysis of the scientific evidence might have been
more evenhanded if he had been bound by a standard in which something
less than unanimity in the literature were required. A turn to the empirical
might not have strongly influenced Justice Kennedy's conclusions, but it
would have elucidated more of his narrow tailoring concerns and would have
shone more light on the viability and relative effectiveness of his alternatives
to the school districts' race-conscious assignment policies. At the very least,
equal protection doctrine and guidance for policy makers and the lower
courts would have been better developed in Grutter and Parents Involved
through a strong basis in evidence requirement, notwithstanding the Justices'
fixed voting alignments.
CONCLUSION
As policy makers, researchers, and the courts move forward with the
development and assessment of race-conscious policies and other
governmental actions that trigger equal protection analysis, it will be
essential to draw on social facts and relevant scientific evidence. Parents
Involved and other recent equal protection cases demonstrate that
constitutional fact finding and the citation of scientific evidence are complex
endeavors closely bound to constitutional frameworks. Scientific evidence
can fit into these frameworks in many ways, and changes to the inquiries and
the evidentiary bases for equal protection analysis may yield better reasoned
and less purely ideological decisions. Ultimately, however, the task of
constitutional interpretation remains centrally driven by constitutional values.
The insights of scientific evidence may be critical to litigation in the short
run, but their more powerful influence may be in the long run as "modem
authority" that helps frame and inform evolving norms of equality.
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